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Redefining the Rights of Undocumented Workers
Abstract

Should a nation extend legal rights to those who enter the country illegally? The Supreme Court recently
addressed this question when it held that unauthorized immigrants who are fired illegally for unionizing
cannot recover monetary remedies. This has led to a significant decline in employment protections for
unauthorized immigrants beyond the unionized sector. For example, some courts now question whether
unauthorized immigrants can receive full remedies for sexual harassment, workplace discrimination, or onthe-job injuries.
Scholars have criticized these losses but have yet to formulate a coherent framework for evaluating the
employment rights of unauthorized immigrants. This article does so by distilling and applying several core
principles at issue when employment laws conflict with immigration laws. I begin by explaining how the text
and purpose of selected immigration and employment statutes show that Congress never intended to restrict
unauthorized immigrants’ employment rights. Remedial restrictions not only harm the workplace protections
at issue, they fail to discourage illegal immigration. Thus, neither legislative intent nor national immigration
goals justify limiting the workplace remedies available to unauthorized immigrants.
Although the future rights of unauthorized workers will turn partly on the issues of statutory purpose and
immigration policy discussed in the early sections of the article, equally important are the consequences of
diminished rights. Accordingly, the article concludes by explaining why restricting workplace protections
based on status harms citizens as well as immigrants. Cunningham-Parmeter contends that employment
protections are “rights of partial inclusion” that reflect a distinctive sphere - the workplace - where
unauthorized immigrants should be placed on par with citizens in pursuing collective interests. In contrast to
arguments that favor limiting resources to lawful residents, partial inclusion explains how employment
protections can effectively preserve national identity while simultaneously enhancing unauthorized
immigrants’ incentives for social investment. In doing so, partial inclusion furthers the community’s selfdefinition, while providing unauthorized immigrants with a sense of belonging in a world increasingly focused
on their exclusion.
Keywords
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INTRODUCTION
Unauthorized immigrants live in precarious times. American
demand for inexpensive goods draws international migrants to our
factories and fields. Developing nations encourage their people to
work in the United States. As they are pushed and pulled toward the
1
country, immigrants arrive in the United States to find armed
Minutemen at the border and a growing public distaste for the
2
unauthorized arrivals. They are wanted yet disdained, needed yet
derided.
Most Americans and the immigrants themselves would be surprised
to learn that these “lawbreakers” receive a host of legal protections
3
once they cross the border. The extent of those rights falls along a
4
sliding scale of status. From the unauthorized immigrant, to the
lawful permanent resident, to the naturalized citizen, a person’s
basket of rights fills as his immigration status formalizes.
The naturalized citizen can vote and participate on a jury; the
5
temporary worker cannot. The long-term resident alien can claim
6
public benefits; the unauthorized immigrant cannot. But even
unauthorized immigrants—those who stand at the bottom of the
status scale—enjoy certain rights. For example, they are “persons”
under the Constitution who enjoy equal protection and due process
7
of law.
1. See Howard F. Chang, The Immigration Paradox: Poverty, Distributive Justice, and
Liberal Egalitarianism, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 759, 760–61 (2003) (discussing migration
trends); see also JEFFREY S. PASSEL, THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT POPULATION IN THE U.S. i–ii (2006) (same).
2. See DAVID JACOBSEN, RIGHTS ACROSS BORDERS: IMMIGRATION AND THE DECLINE
OF CITIZENSHIP 42 (1997) (discussing public attitudes toward unauthorized
immigrants); Kevin R. Johnson, The End of “Civil Rights” as We Know It?: Immigration
and Civil Rights in the New Millennium, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1481, 1485 (2002) (same).
3. See Linda Bosniak, Varieties of Citizenship, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2449, 2451
(2007) (challenging the “apparently self-evident notion that ‘citizenship is for
citizens’”); Maria L. Ontiveros, Three Perspectives on Workplace Harassment of Women of
Color, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 817, 822 (1993) (stating that unauthorized
immigrants are often unaware of their legal rights).
4. I use the term “unauthorized immigrants” to refer to foreign nationals who
live in the United States without work authorization. The term is designed to avoid
the political charge and semantic difficulties presented by labels such as “illegal
alien” and “undocumented immigrant.” See Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Fear of
Discovery: Immigrant Workers and the Fifth Amendment, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 27, 29 n.7
(2008) (explaining the term).
5. See 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(1) (2006) (excluding any person who “is not a citizen
of the United States” from jury service).
6. See Michael Scaperlanda, Who Is My Neighbor?: An Essay on Immigrants, Welfare
Reform, and the Constitution, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1587, 1588–92 (1997) (discussing
restrictions on public benefits).
7. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 213–31 (1982) (holding that a Texas statute
denying public education to unauthorized immigrant children violates the Equal
Protection Clause); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (“Even one whose
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Regardless of status, there is a floor on the level of protections
enjoyed by all persons territorially present in the United States.
The extension of legal rights to “lawbreakers,” however, raises several
questions. Why would a host country grant legal protections to
people who flout the country’s rules of admission? Is the currency of
“citizenship” in all its forms enhanced or diminished by extending
rights to the unauthorized? What are the implications of a nationstate’s decision to rescind those rights?
Political and legal theorists have grappled with these questions as
8
they relate to contemporary issues of membership. They have
considered how immigration law serves the need for a bounded
political community and whether extending rights to immigrants
9
dilutes the notion of citizenship. Yet the issues most often raised in
these discussions involve border enforcement, admission, and
exclusion—traditional topics of immigration law. This Article seeks
to expand the dialogue by explaining how workplace rights can
define membership in a community.
Until recently, unauthorized immigrants could claim virtually every
right and remedy available under federal workplace protections.
In most instances they could join unions, sue for sexual harassment,
10
and assert other employment rights in the same manner as citizens.
The United States Supreme Court disrupted this parity, however,
when it barred unauthorized immigrants from receiving monetary
11
compensation when they are fired illegally for supporting a union.
For the first time, the Court announced that not all victims of union12
related discrimination should be treated the same. Employers have
attempted to expand this remedial limitation from the unionized
setting (i.e., “traditional labor law”) to other workplace protections,
presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled to [Fifth
Amendment] protection.”); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896)
(affirming the applicability of due process and speedy trial rights guaranteed by the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments to unauthorized Chinese immigrants).
8. See, e.g., Linda Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
447, 448–50 (2000) (discussing the debate over the meaning of “citizenship” among
political and social theorists).
9. See generally Jennifer Gordon & R.A. Lenhardt, Citizenship Talk: Bridging the
Gap Between Immigration and Race Perspectives, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2493, 2502 (2007)
(summarizing discourse on membership).
10. See Michael Wishnie, Emerging Issues for Undocumented Workers, 6 U. PA. J. LAB.
& EMP. L. 497, 501–02 (2004) (discussing coverage of unauthorized immigrants
under employment statutes). But see infra Part I and accompanying text (discussing
the few instances in which an employee’s immigration status limited employment
protections).
11. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 151 (2002).
12. See id. (holding that unauthorized immigrants are not entitled to recover
backpay).
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such as wage and antidiscrimination laws, with limited success.
For example, women in New Jersey who are unauthorized immigrants
13
can no longer recover backpay for pregnancy discrimination.
14
The same is true for sexual harassment claims in Texas, workplace
15
16
injury claims in Michigan, and wage retaliation claims in Illinois.
Scholars have criticized these losses but have yet to formulate a
coherent framework for evaluating the rights of unauthorized
immigrants. This Article does so by distilling and applying several
core principles at issue when employment laws conflict with
immigration laws.
In Part I, I survey the current state of employment protections for
unauthorized immigrants. Beginning with case law that originally
ignored the role immigration status played in employment claims,
I show how the rights of unauthorized workers remained intact until
fairly recently.
In Part II, I describe three possible endpoints to the decline in
rights. These options include: an “equalized rights” scenario, in
which unauthorized immigrants enjoy all employment rights and
remedies; a “diminished rights” scenario, in which unauthorized
immigrants lack the ability to bring workplace claims; and an
“ambiguous rights” scenario, in which unauthorized immigrants
enjoy certain workplace protections but not others, thereby causing
them to assert fewer claims because of the cluttered state of the law.
In order to determine the likelihood of each outcome, I identify
several functional concerns at issue when unauthorized immigrants
assert workplace claims. For example, the Supreme Court has
considered the remedial purpose of federal employment laws and the
institutional competence of agencies enforcing those protections
when deciding whether to limit unauthorized immigrants’
17
recoveries.
I apply these criteria to wage and antidiscrimination
protections and contend that differences in statutory purpose
between traditional labor law and other workplace protections
counsel in favor of equalized employment rights.

13. See Crespo v. Evergro Corp., 841 A.2d 471, 472–73 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2004) (upholding an employer’s discharge of an unauthorized immigrant returning
from maternity leave).
14. See Escobar v. Spartan Sec. Serv., 281 F. Supp. 2d 895, 896–98 (S.D. Tex.
2003) (dismissing a plaintiff’s claims for backpay under Title VII).
15. See Sanchez v. Eagle Alloy Inc., 658 N.W.2d 510, 512 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003)
(denying wage-loss benefits).
16. See Renteria v. Italia Foods, Inc., No. 02C495, 2003 WL 21995190, at *6 (N.D.
Ill. Aug. 21, 2003) (striking an unauthorized worker’s claims for backpay).
17. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 144-49 (2002).

2009] REDEFINING THE RIGHTS OF UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS

1365

In Part III, I explain that in addition to the functional concerns
discussed in Part II, unauthorized immigrants’ rights depend on the
immigration-related incentives created by extending protections to
all workers. Because limiting the employment protections available
to unauthorized workers will not fundamentally alter the incentives
driving illegal immigration, I argue that national immigration goals
cannot be achieved through diminished employment rights.
Nonetheless, equalized rights are far from inevitable. In fact, the
inherently malleable nature of any analysis involving immigrationrelated incentives could lead to a significant loss of protections for
unauthorized workers. For example, the Supreme Court has stated
that awarding backpay to unauthorized immigrants rewards their
18
illegal behavior. These same incentives arguably apply to federal
minimum wage protections. An immigrant who enters the country
illegally, tenders false documents to obtain employment, and then
sues for nonpayment of wages could also be characterized as
receiving a “reward.” Although there are key distinctions between
“backpay” under different workplace protections, it is not entirely
clear whether these distinctions respond to the Supreme Court’s
focus on immigration-related incentives. If they do not, then the
diminished rights scenario becomes more likely.
Although the future rights of unauthorized workers will turn partly
on the foregoing analysis of statutory purpose and immigration
policy, equally important are the consequences of diminished rights.
I conclude the Article by explaining why restricting workplace
protections based on status harms citizens as well as immigrants.
I argue that employment protections are “rights of partial inclusion”
that reflect a distinctive sphere—the workplace—where unauthorized
immigrants should be placed on par with citizens in pursuing
collective interests.
The theory of partial inclusion responds to communitarian
rationales embedded in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on
unauthorized workers. From a communitarian standpoint, firm
19
borders preserve community identity and protect scarce resources.
According to a communitarian approach to employment protections,
enlarging the circle of workplace rights to include unauthorized
20
immigrants harms the community’s project of self-definition.
18. Id. at 145.
19. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY
31 (1983); see also Gordon & Lenhardt, supra note 9, at 2501 (discussing
communitarian views).
20. See WALZER, supra note 19, at 31–32 (discussing community membership).
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Consistent with this view, the Supreme Court has attempted to limit
labor protections based on an employee’s immigration status in order
to bolster immigration law’s system of determining “who belongs” at
21
work and, consequently, in the community. Here I argue that such
restrictions undermine the core normative object of the
communitarians: the need for members to invest in their community
with a shared common purpose. Antidiscrimination statutes depend
on universal enforcement. Wage rates are more likely to drop for
members of the community, including citizens, if employers are
attracted to job applicants who cannot recover the minimum wage.
Workplace rights are not scarce resources, and the ends that
employment
laws
seek
to
achieve—safer
conditions,
nondiscrimination, and minimum wages—are goals shared by every
worker, regardless of status. All members of the community—status
citizens and unauthorized immigrants alike—benefit when the entire
workforce can assert these rights. Employment protections thus turn
communitarian rationales on their head by arguing in favor of
extending rights to nonmembers.
The workplace rights of unauthorized immigrants remain in flux.
Advocates and scholars sympathetic to these workers have reassured
one another that restrictions in labor law will not expand to other
workplace laws such as wage and antidiscrimination protections.
Although this prediction may be true, a compelling case has yet to be
made based on a detailed analysis of statutory purpose, immigration
policy, and citizenship theory. This Article builds a framework for
equalized rights by engaging these topics.
I.

ERODING RIGHTS

Immigration law did not collide with employment law until
recently. Throughout most of the nation’s history, immigration law
said nothing about the terms and conditions of an immigrant’s
22
23
employment. Even the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) —
21. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 149–50.
22. See generally THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND
CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 146–62 (5th ed. 2003) (discussing the historical
development of immigration law); Christopher Ho & Jennifer C. Chang, Drawing the
Line After Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB: Strategies for Protecting
Undocumented Workers in the Title VII Context and Beyond, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J.
473, 478–79 (2005) (same).
23. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1101–1537 (2006)); see also Katherine E. Seitz, Comment, Enter at Your Own Risk:
The Impact of Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. National Labor Relations Board on the
Undocumented Worker, 82 N.C. L. REV. 366, 372–73 (2003) (arguing that immigration
laws and labor statutes are generally silent as to their effect on one another).
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the country’s central immigration law—did not address unauthorized
24
employment when Congress enacted it in 1952. Although the INA
made it illegal for a person to enter the country without permission,
an immigrant did not violate any other laws by obtaining employment
25
once inside the United States.
26
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA)
attempted to close this loophole by adding employment-related
restrictions to the INA. In addition to granting legal status to two
million unauthorized immigrants residing in the country at the
27
time, the IRCA imposed immigration verification requirements on
28
As a result, employers are now required to inspect
employers.
certain documents provided by new hires and to attest to the
29
documents’ apparent authenticity.
Because immigration law said nothing about “illegal” employment
until the IRCA, courts generally did not question the right of
unauthorized immigrants to sue employers prior to 1986. For
example, courts consistently held that unauthorized immigrants
enjoyed the minimum wage protections of the Fair Labor Standards
30
Act (FLSA), the labor protections of the National Labor Relations
31
Act (NLRA), and the antidiscrimination protections of Title VII of
32
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII). These pre-IRCA decisions
24. See William J. Murphy, Note, Immigration Reform Without Control: The Need for
an Integrated Immigration-Labor Policy, 17 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 165, 165–66
(1994) (discussing previous versions of the INA).
25. See Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric
Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 499 (2007)
(discussing immigration-related violations); Seitz, supra note 23, at 372–73
(emphasizing that previous versions of the INA did not make the employment of
unauthorized immigrants illegal).
26. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 8 U.S.C.).
27. See Kris W. Kobach, Remark, Administrative Law: Immigration, Amnesty, and the
Rule of Law, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1323, 1330 (2008) (discussing the effects of the
IRCA).
28. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2006); see Kati L. Griffith, Comment, A Supreme Stretch:
The Supremacy Clause in the Wake of IRCA and Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 41
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 127, 128–29 (2008) (discussing the IRCA’s work verification
system).
29. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b) (2006).
30. See, e.g., In re Reyes, 814 F.2d 168, 170 (5th Cir. 1987) (applying pre-IRCA law
and noting the broad definition of “employee” under the FLSA); Donovan v. Burgett
Greenhouses, Inc., 759 F.2d 1483, 1485 (10th Cir. 1985) (affirming the right of
unauthorized immigrants to recover unpaid wages under the FLSA).
31. See, e.g., NLRB v. Apollo Tire Co., 604 F.2d 1180, 1181 (9th Cir. 1979)
(holding that unauthorized immigrants are “employees” as defined in section 2(3) of
the NLRA).
32. See, e.g., EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1517 (9th Cir. 1989)
(sex discrimination); Rios v. Enter. Ass’n Steamfitters Local Union 638, 860 F.2d
1168, 1172 (2d Cir. 1988) (race and national origin discrimination).
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affirmed the workplace rights of unauthorized immigrants based on:
(1) the broad definitions of “employee” contained in the relevant
employment laws; and (2) the INA’s silence as to unauthorized
33
employment.
The most important development in pre-IRCA case law occurred in
34
1984 when the Supreme Court decided Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB. The
case involved a union-organizing campaign at a small leather
35
processing plant. The company president, who knew prior to the
election that five of the eleven workers were unauthorized
immigrants, reported the employees to the Immigration and
36
Naturalization Service (INS) after the workers voted to unionize.
37
The INS arrested the employees and returned them to Mexico. In
response to charges filed against the employer, the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) found that Sure-Tan had committed unfair
labor practices by calling the INS in retaliation for the workers’
38
protected activity.
The NLRB awarded the employees the
39
“conventional remedy of reinstatement with backpay.”
On review, the Supreme Court first addressed the issue of statutory
coverage. Noting that the NLRA states, “The term ‘employee’ shall
40
include any employee,” and contains specific exceptions, none of
which involve immigration status, the Court held that the NLRA
41
covers unauthorized immigrants. Turning to the issue of remedies,
the Court found that the Sure-Tan employees were not legally
available for work because they would have to cross the border
42
illegally in order to obtain new employment.
Accordingly, the
employees who lost their jobs because of Sure-Tan’s “blatantly illegal
course of conduct” could not receive backpay or reinstatement until
43
immigration authorities readmitted them to the country.
Although Sure-Tan was the Court’s first attempt to delineate the
employment rights of unauthorized immigrants, the decision did not
significantly impact the field for two reasons. First, the Court failed
33. See In re Reyes, 814 F.2d at 170 (discussing the FLSA’s definition of
“employee”); NLRB v. Apollo Tire Co., 604 F.2d at 1184 (noting the INA’s silence as
to employment matters).
34. 467 U.S. 883 (1984).
35. Id. at 886.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 887.
38. Sure-Tan, Inc., 234 N.L.R.B. 1187, 1187 (1978).
39. Id.
40. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006).
41. See Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 891 (“The breadth of § 2(3)’s definition is striking:
the Act squarely applies to ‘any employee.’”).
42. Id. at 903.
43. Id. at 894.
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to clarify whether the backpay limitation applied to unauthorized
immigrants residing in the United States, as opposed to the five Sure44
Tan employees in Mexico. Second, the decision relied explicitly on
45
the INA’s “peripheral concern with employment of illegal entrants.”
With the enactment of the IRCA two years later, however, the
relationship of immigration law to employment law was no longer
peripheral. The new verification requirements injected the nation’s
immigration laws directly into the workplace.
Somewhat surprisingly, unauthorized workers’ rights remained
relatively unchanged for the first two decades following Sure-Tan and
the IRCA. With few exceptions, courts continued to hold that
unauthorized immigrants could recover backpay and other remedies
46
for workplace violations. The field changed significantly in 2002,
however, with the Supreme Court’s decision in Hoffman Plastic
47
Like Sure-Tan, Hoffman involved an
Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB.
employer who retaliated against unauthorized immigrants who
engaged in activities protected by the NLRA; Hoffman committed an
48
unfair labor practice by firing Jose Castro for supporting a union.
During a subsequent compliance hearing to calculate his damages,
Mr. Castro admitted that he had tendered fraudulent immigration49
related documents to Hoffman at the time he was hired. The NLRB
awarded Mr. Castro over $60,000 in backpay, despite the fact that
50
Mr. Castro had misled his employer about his immigration status.
On review, the Supreme Court considered whether the NLRB
correctly awarded Mr. Castro backpay for the work he lost because of
51
the illegal discharge. Writing for the 5-4 majority, Justice Rehnquist
described “a legal landscape now significantly changed” by the
44. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 146–47 (2002)
(describing a split of authority as to whether Sure-Tan “applies only to aliens who left
the United States and thus cannot claim backpay without lawful reentry”).
45. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 892 (quoting De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 359
(1976)).
46. See, e.g., NLRB v. Kolkka, 170 F.3d 937, 940 (9th Cir. 1999) (extending
coverage under the NLRA to unauthorized workers); NLRB v. A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil
Buyers Group, Inc., 134 F.3d 50, 58 (2d Cir. 1997) (NLRA); Rios v. Enter. Ass’n
Steamfitters Local Union 638, 860 F.2d 1168, 1173 (2d Cir. 1988) (Title VII); Patel v.
Quality Inn S., 846 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1988) (FLSA); In re Reyes, 814 F.2d 168,
170 (5th Cir. 1987) (FLSA). But see, e.g., Egbuna v. Time-Life Libraries, Inc., 153
F.3d 184, 186–87 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that unauthorized immigrants are not
“qualified” for employment under Title VII); Del Rey Tortilleria, Inc. v. NLRB, 976
F.2d 1115, 1120–22 (7th Cir. 1992) (extending the NLRA’s coverage to unauthorized
immigrants but denying backpay).
47. 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
48. Id. at 140.
49. Id. at 141.
50. Id. at 141–42.
51. Id.
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52

IRCA.
The Court reversed the NLRB as to the backpay award,
holding that to do otherwise would reward Mr. Castro’s illegal
behavior and conflict with the IRCA’s border-enforcement
53
objectives.
Soon after Hoffman, employers began to argue that unauthorized
immigrants could no longer sue under Title VII, the FLSA, or any
54
other workplace protection. To date, nearly every court to rule on
the issue has refused to extend the backpay limitation in NLRA cases
55
to minimum wage and overtime protections.
Discrimination cases have yielded more mixed results, though
unauthorized immigrants may still recover full Title VII remedies in
56
most jurisdictions. Actions outside the courts suggest that Title VII
remains somewhat vulnerable to remedial losses. Following Hoffman,
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which
enforces Title VII, rescinded its previous support for extending
57
backpay to all workers regardless of status. In addition, some Title
VII plaintiffs now withdraw their backpay claims rather than allow
58
courts to rule on whether the remedy remains available to them.
Scholars have expressed widely divergent views on whether the
current backpay restrictions in labor law will extend to other
employment protections. One camp argues that Hoffman represents
a human rights crisis that will cause a great shift in the workplace
52. Id. at 147.
53. Id. at 145 (citing Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 903 (1984)).
54. See Mariel Martinez, Comment, The Hoffman Aftermath: Analyzing the Plight of
the Undocumented Worker Through a “Wider Lens”, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 661, 663–64
(2005) (discussing employer reactions to Hoffman).
55. See, e.g., Chellen v. John Pickle Co., 446 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1276–77 (N.D.
Okla. 2006) (discussing the definition of “employee” under the FLSA); Zavala v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 295, 323 (D.N.J. 2005) (concluding that
unauthorized immigrants are “employees” under the FLSA); Galaviz-Zamora v. Brady
Farms, Inc., 230 F.R.D. 499, 501–03 (W.D. Mich. 2005) (explaining that the FLSA
effectively protects unauthorized workers from exploitation and retaliation); Flores v.
Amigon, 233 F. Supp. 2d 462, 463 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (agreeing with other courts that
have applied the FLSA to employees regardless of their immigration status).
56. Compare Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1067 (9th Cir. 2004)
(distinguishing Title VII from Hoffman), with Escobar v. Spartan Sec. Serv., 281 F.
Supp. 2d 895, 896–98 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (denying backpay under Title VII).
57. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, DIRECTIVES TRANSMITTAL NO.
915.002, RESCISSION OF ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO
UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS UNDER FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (2002),
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/undoc-rescind.html.
58. See Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., No. CIV-F-99-6443, 2006 WL 845925, at *1 (E.D.
Cal. Mar. 31, 2006) (Title VII plaintiffs who are unable to prove entitlement to work
agree to withdraw backpay claims); Lopez v. Superflex, Ltd., No. 01 CIV. 10010, 2002
WL 1941484, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2002) (plaintiff alleging disability
discrimination withdraws backpay claim “in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Hoffman”).
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59

rights of unauthorized immigrants.
These critics contend that
immigrants face an increasingly hostile judiciary that will eventually
eliminate certain workplace rights available to unauthorized
60
immigrants. Others assert that Hoffman is limited to the NLRA and
61
will not affect other employment statutes.
Given the inconsistency among the responses to Hoffman, it is safe
to say that immigrants’ rights will remain undefined for the indefinite
62
future.
This disarray underscores the need for a coherent
framework for evaluating the future rights of unauthorized workers.
II. THE FUNCTION OF EMPLOYMENT PROTECTIONS
Three possible outcomes could emerge from the current
amorphous state of unauthorized workers’ rights. Here I explain
those outcomes and consider the likelihood of each based on the
structure and purpose of wage and antidiscrimination statutes, as
compared to labor law.
I call the first scenario an “equalized rights” outcome. Congress
might pass legislation that blunts the force of Hoffman or the
Supreme Court may reverse itself. Lower courts could refuse to
extend current backpay limitations to Title VII and the FLSA. In the
equalized rights outcome, all employees could recover nearly every
63
workplace remedy regardless of status. Unauthorized immigrants

59. See, e.g., LANCE COMPA, UNFAIR ADVANTAGE:
WORKERS’ FREEDOM OF
ASSOCIATION IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS
xxi (2004) (suggesting that workplace protections may be forfeited); Robert I.
Correales, Did Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., Produce Disposable Workers?,
14 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 103, 146 (2003) (speculating that statutory protections for
unauthorized immigrants may be in danger in some jurisdictions following Hoffman).
60. See, e.g., Seitz, supra note 23, at 406–07 (expressing concerns that Hoffman
may be used to deny minimum wage and workers’ compensation protections);
see also Wishnie, supra note 10, at 508 (suggesting that unauthorized immigrants may
lose the ability to recover backpay under Title VII).
61. See, e.g., Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, Borderline Decisions: Hoffman
Plastic Compounds, The New Bracero Program, and the Supreme Court’s Role in Making
Federal Labor Policy, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1, 5 n.19 (2003) (predicting limited impact);
Christine Dana Smith, Comment, Give Us Your Tired, Your Poor: Hoffman and the
Future of Immigrants’ Workplace Rights, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 363, 364 (2003) (arguing that
Hoffman does not extend to Title VII or the FLSA).
62. See María Pabón López, The Place of the Undocumented Worker in the United States
Legal System After Hoffman Plastic Compounds: An Assessment and Comparison with
Argentina’s Legal System, 15 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 301, 321 (2005) (arguing that
“the future is yet to come” for unauthorized immigrants asserting Title VII claims);
Seitz, supra note 23, at 370 (“[T]he rights of undocumented workers are perilously
undefined.”).
63. Unauthorized immigrants would remain ineligible for reinstatement,
however, given that courts could not order employers to rehire unauthorized
immigrants in violation of the IRCA. See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing the remedies
available to unauthorized immigrants).
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would still largely fail to assert these rights out of fear of retaliation or
deportation, but the rights themselves would be available.
The second outcome, what I call an “ambiguous rights” scenario,
reflects the current, muddled state of affairs. Because employers
have experienced limited success in their attempts to extend
remedial limitations in labor law to other employment laws such as
antidiscrimination protections, unauthorized immigrants do not
know which claims remain viable.
Given that unauthorized
immigrants are already reluctant to complain for fear of retaliation,
the ambiguity surrounding their employment rights further decreases
the likelihood that they will attempt to rectify workplace wrongs.
Under the third scenario, a “diminished rights” outcome, clarity is
restored to the field. Legislative action or judicial consistency will
state definitively that unauthorized immigrants can no longer recover
certain remedies for employment violations. This could mean
limiting backpay awards or banning unauthorized immigrants from
asserting workplace claims altogether.
All three outcomes remain possible because courts have failed to
establish clear criteria for resolving conflicts between employment
laws and immigration laws. Here I develop those criteria based on
the functional concerns expressed by the Supreme Court in its recent
jurisprudence on unauthorized workers. By “functional concerns”
I mean the structure and purpose of employment statutes as they
relate to immigration restrictions. The Court has twice considered
the function of the NLRA as it relates to the INA. In these cases, the
Court restricted the remedies available to unauthorized immigrants,
finding that the NLRB is not competent to evaluate immigration
policy and that a backpay limitation would not undermine the basic
64
purpose of the NLRA.
By applying the same functional criteria—administrative
competence and remedial purpose—to Title VII and the FLSA, I will
explain why wage and antidiscrimination protections cannot be
restricted in the same way that the Supreme Court has limited the
NLRA. Title VII and the FLSA are certainly not the only employment
statutes at issue, but they are arguably the most critical given that they
secure such fundamental workplace interests as freedom from
discrimination and payment of wages. In addition, employers have
expended a great deal of effort on limiting backpay under Title VII

64. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 152 (2002); SureTan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 883 (1984).

2009] REDEFINING THE RIGHTS OF UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS

1373

and the FLSA, making these statutes crucial fault lines in the debate
65
over the rights of unauthorized workers.
A. Moving Beyond Statutory Text
The most logical starting point for determining whether
immigration laws should limit Title VII and the FLSA would be the
text of the relevant statutes—in this case, the IRCA and the
66
employment statutes that the IRCA supposedly limits. Oddly, the
Supreme Court’s recent decisions on unauthorized workers largely
sidestep issues of statutory interpretation in favor of a broader policy
analysis. The basis of the Court’s authority to focus on policy while
ignoring statutory text and history is not entirely clear. After all,
there is no canon of statutory construction that allows courts to “pick
67
and choose” their favorite congressional enactments based on vague
68
The Hoffman Court stated that the IRCA is
notions of “policy.”
69
“understandably silent” as to its effect on the NLRA. This silence
notwithstanding, the Court inferred an intent to displace labor law
remedies based on Congress’s decision to criminalize immigration70
related document fraud.
Although congressional silence led to diminished rights in the
context of the NLRA, Title VII and the FLSA played a much more
prominent role than the NLRA in congressional deliberations on the
IRCA. Unfortunately, most scholarly critiques of Hoffman have
glossed over this point. When the argument over congressional
intent is raised, the discussion is usually limited to two congressional
committee reports. The House Judiciary Committee reviewing the
IRCA stated:
It is not the intention of the Committee that the employer
sanctions provisions of the bill be used to undermine or diminish
in any way labor protections in existing law, or to limit the powers

65. See, e.g., Martinez, supra note 54, at 673 (discussing attempts to limit
antidiscrimination statutes); Mohar Ray, Note, Undocumented Asian American Workers
and State Wage Laws in the Aftermath of Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 13 ASIAN AM. L.J.
91, 97 (2006) (noting Hoffman’s impact on wage claims).
66. See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 300–01 (1989) (“Interpretation
of a statute must begin with the statute’s language.”).
67. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974) (“[C]ourts are not at liberty
to pick and choose among congressional enactments.”).
68. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 154 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Where in the immigration
laws can the Court find a ‘policy’ that might warrant taking from the Board this
critically important remedial power? Certainly not in any statutory language.”).
See generally William W. Buzbee, The One-Congress Fiction in Statutory Interpretation, 149
U. PA. L. REV. 171, 231–36 (2000) (discussing different methods of statutory analysis).
69. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 149 (majority opinion).
70. Id.
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of federal or state labor relations boards . . . to remedy unfair
71
practices committed against undocumented employees.

The House Education and Labor Committee stated that the IRCA
did not prevent federal agencies, including the NLRB, the EEOC,
and the Department of Labor (DOL), from “remedy[ing] unfair
72
practices committed against undocumented employees.”
These reports appear to support equalized rights in wage and
discrimination cases. They reaffirm the authority of the EEOC and
DOL, which enforce Title VII and the FLSA respectively, to obtain
full remedies for unauthorized immigrants. Yet the Hoffman Court
expressly rejected this legislative history, describing the Judiciary
73
Committee report as “a rather slender reed” on which to rely. Given
the Court’s rather dismissive treatment of the legislative history, it
seems unlikely that the committee reports alone will immunize Title
VII and the FLSA from remedial restrictions.
This is not to say that courts considering whether to limit remedies
in Title VII and FLSA cases should ignore the IRCA’s legislative
history. Rather, the analysis should extend beyond committee
reports to other evidence related to the IRCA’s effect, if any, on
substantive employment protections. In the case of the FLSA,
congressional action points toward equalized rights. For example, at
the same time it enacted the IRCA, Congress appropriated additional
funds to the DOL’s Wage and Hour Division “in order to deter the
employment of unauthorized aliens and remove the economic
74
incentive for employers to exploit and use such aliens.” This step
was consistent with efforts by the Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan
Administrations to fund targeted wage enforcement actions on behalf
75
of unauthorized workers.
It is no coincidence that the same
legislation barred unauthorized workers from obtaining employment
and appropriated additional funds to allow them to recover overtime

71. H.R. REP. NO. 99-682, pt. 1, at 58 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649,
5662.
72. H.R. REP. NO. 99-682, pt. 2, at 8–9 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5757,
5758.
73. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 149 n.4; see Agri Processor Co. v. NLRB, 514 F.3d 1,
13–14 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“[O]ne of the reports cited by
the majority opinion is the exact same report that the Hoffman Court dismissed as a
‘rather slender reed.’” (citation omitted)).
74. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), Pub. L. No. 99-603,
§ 111(d), 100 Stat. 3359, 3381 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
8 U.S.C.).
75. See Richard E. Blum, Note, Labor Standards Enforcement and the Realities of Labor
Migration: Protecting Undocumented Workers after Sure-Tan, the IRCA, and Patel,
63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1342, 1360–68 (1988) (discussing the history of immigration and
labor enforcement).
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and the minimum wage. Both acts serve the same goal: to raise the
price of hiring this group of workers. Employers pay the price either
through IRCA penalties or wage enforcement actions brought on
76
behalf of unauthorized immigrants.
Congress also considered Title VII, albeit indirectly, when enacting
the IRCA. Legislators were concerned that the IRCA’s work
verification requirements would cause employers to discriminate
77
against “foreign-looking” and “foreign-sounding” job applicants.
Accordingly, Congress included protections in the IRCA to prevent
78
discrimination based on national origin and citizenship status. For
example, employers cannot refuse to hire job applicants because they
79
Critically, Congress expressly excluded
are foreign-born.
“unauthorized aliens” from the IRCA’s antidiscrimination
80
protections. Thus, unauthorized immigrants cannot file an IRCA
complaint if a company commits national origin discrimination
against them. Unlike the IRCA, Title VII contains no such express
exclusion.
Statutes should be read in a manner that gives each term
81
meaning. The only interpretation that gives meaning to the IRCA’s
exclusion of “unauthorized aliens” is that without the exclusion, the
IRCA’s antidiscrimination provision would cover this group of
workers. Because Title VII contains no such exclusion, the argument
goes, it should be read as covering all employees regardless of status.
76. See Noriega-Perez v. United States, 179 F.3d 1166, 1170–71 (9th Cir. 1999)
(discussing the purpose of the IRCA’s enforcement scheme); Patel v. Quality Inn S.,
846 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1988) (maintaining that Congress intended for the
FLSA to protect undocumented workers, as demonstrated by its appropriation of
additional funds for this group of workers in order to enforce the FLSA); Susan
Charnesky, Comment, Protection for Undocumented Workers Under the FLSA:
An Evaluation in Light of IRCA, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 379, 397–98 (1988) (same);
see also Ho & Chang, supra note 22, at 483–84 (noting that the IRCA provided
funding for the heightened enforcement of labor standards so as to discourage
employers from hiring unauthorized immigrants).
77. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, GAO/GGD-90-62,
IMMIGRATION REFORM: EMPLOYER SANCTIONS AND THE QUESTION OF DISCRIMINATION
41–42 (1990), available at http://archive.gao.gov/d24t8/140974.pdf; see also Cynthia
Bansak & Steven Raphael, Immigration Reform and the Earnings of Latino Workers:
Do Employer Sanctions Cause Discrimination?, 54 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 275, 277 (2001)
(discussing discrimination under the IRCA); Sarah Cleveland et al., Inter-American
Court of Human Rights Amicus Curiae Brief: The United States Violates International Law
When Labor Law Remedies Are Restricted Based on Workers’ Migrant Status, 1 SEATTLE J.
SOC. JUST. 795, 802 (2003) (discussing employer retaliation).
78. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b (2006).
79. Id. § 1324b(a)(1).
80. Id.
81. See Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., 486 U.S. 825, 837 (1988) (“As
our cases have noted in the past, we are hesitant to adopt an interpretation of a
congressional enactment which renders superfluous another portion of that same
law.”).
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Of course, one statute’s express exclusion of unauthorized
immigrants (the IRCA) does not necessarily preclude another
statute’s implied exclusion (Title VII). However, given that the two
statutes prohibit an identical type of behavior (national origin
82
discrimination) and force employers who engage in that behavior to
compensate employees with the same remedy (backpay), the fact that
Congress felt compelled to expressly exclude unauthorized
immigrants from the IRCA should at least inform an interpretation of
Title VII.
The IRCA’s text states explicitly that it has “no effect on EEOC
83
authority.” When Congress enacted the IRCA in 1986, most courts
and the EEOC itself had uniformly interpreted “EEOC authority” to
include securing backpay for unauthorized immigrants who were the
victims of discrimination based on national origin and other
84
protected categories. Congress is presumed to know judicial and
administrative interpretations of existing law “pertinent to the
85
legislation it enacts.”
Therefore, when it stated that the IRCA’s
antidiscrimination
provision
relating
to
national
origin
discrimination had no effect on the EEOC’s authority to combat
national origin discrimination, Congress was aware that lower courts
and the agency itself had interpreted its authority to include securing
full remedies for unauthorized workers.
Congress knows how to limit the workplace protections of
unauthorized immigrants when it decides to do so.
IRCA’s
prohibition on national origin discrimination does exactly that, but
Title VII’s prohibition on national origin discrimination says nothing
86
about excluding “unauthorized aliens.” The IRCA was amended
twice in the 1990s, both times excluding “unauthorized aliens” from
82. Title VII applies to companies with fifteen or more employees, while the
IRCA’s antidiscrimination provision applies to companies with four to fourteen
employees. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(2)(A), (B) (2006); Juan P. Osuna, Breaking New
Ground: The 1996 Immigration Act’s Provisions on Work Verification and Employer
Sanctions, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 329, 334 (1997).
83. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b (2006).
84. See supra Part I (discussing the pre-IRCA period during which courts
universally extended Title VII coverage to unauthorized immigrants). In 1998, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit became the first and only
federal appellate court to depart from this precedent. Egbuna v. Time-Life Libraries,
Inc., 153 F.3d 184, 186–87 (4th Cir. 1998).
85. Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 184–85 (1988); see also
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580–81 (1978) (“Congress is presumed to be aware of
an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that
interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without any change.”).
86. See generally Ho & Chang, supra note 22, at 506–08 (discussing the IRCA’s
antidiscrimination provisions); Maria L. Ontiveros, To Help Those Most in Need:
Undocumented Workers’ Rights and Remedies Under Title VII, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 607, 615–16 (1993) (discussing congressional intent in enacting the IRCA).
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87

its antidiscrimination protections.
Likewise, Congress amended
88
Title VII in 1991 without mentioning unauthorized immigrants,
89
even though courts were awarding backpay to this group of workers.
Each time Congress amended the legislation without limiting Title
VII’s coverage or remedies, it accepted the judicial consensus on the
90
issue.
The IRCA’s legislative text and history favor equalized rights for
claims brought by unauthorized immigrants in Title VII and FLSA
cases. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has shown a decided lack of
91
interest in considering Congress’s intent in enacting the IRCA.
If lower courts similarly downplay the importance of legislative intent,
the future rights of unauthorized workers will likely turn on other
factors enunciated by the Supreme Court such as the purpose of
wage and antidiscrimination laws and the border-related incentives
they create.
B. Administrative Competence
The Hoffman Court refused to defer to the NLRB’s inexpert
determinations on immigration matters. Thus, although the NLRB
and every federal agency that addressed the issue found that
92
immigration law and labor law could coexist, the Supreme Court
disagreed, noting that the NLRB’s order granting monetary remedies
to unauthorized immigrants “trench[ed] upon a federal statute . . .
93
outside the Board’s competence to administer.” The Court could
disturb the backpay award because it exceeded “the bounds of the
94
Board’s remedial discretion.”
If administrative competence is as important as the Hoffman Court
suggested—and it strongly suggested that this was the most important
95
criterion given its repeated references to the issue —then the
decision will not lead to diminished rights in Title VII and FLSA
cases. The NLRB is a unique administrative body that investigates,

87. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(6); Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 421(a), 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (2006).
89. See EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1517 (9th Cir. 1989) (discussing
the effect of Title VII amendments on immigration law).
90. Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 580.
91. See, e.g., Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 353 U.S. 137, 154 (2002)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for focusing on immigration policy
rather than statutory language and purpose).
92. See id. at 153 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting unanimity among federal
agencies).
93. Id. at 144, 147 (majority opinion).
94. Id. at 149.
95. Id. at 146–52.
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prosecutes, and adjudicates unfair labor practice charges. Although
the NLRB is skilled at evaluating labor law violations, it is not
97
competent to balance outside federal objectives. Unlike charges
brought before the NLRB, Title VII and FLSA claims are prosecuted
98
in court.
Federal judges possess the very expertise needed to
99
balance competing federal interests that the NLRB lacks.
Imagine a Title VII plaintiff who is fired for complaining about
sexual harassment. Although she was an unauthorized immigrant at
the time of the discharge, she later received work authorization
100
through a T-visa because she was a victim of human trafficking.
A federal judge hearing her Title VII case could evaluate the harm
done to immigration policy by awarding the plaintiff backpay.
The judge could compare the relative gravity of the employer’s
conduct, as compared to the immigrant’s now-legalized presence,
and evaluate the incentives for future illegal behavior created by
101
awarding backpay. Although the NLRB cannot engage in this kind
of balancing, the court hearing the Title VII case can.
Despite the logic of the administrative competence argument,
however, it avoids a statutory conflict that the Hoffman Court seemed
determined to confront. In fact, if unfair labor practice charges were
filed in federal court rather than with the NLRB, the outcome in
Hoffman would probably not have changed. Assume that a federal
district court, rather than the NLRB, had awarded backpay to
unauthorized immigrants who were victims of unfair labor practices.
On review, the Hoffman Court would have faced the same conflict
between the IRCA and the NLRA. Even though a lower “expert”
court would have balanced the competing federal objectives, the
Supreme Court likely would have shown no more deference to the
96. See Nhan T. Vu & Jeff Schwartz, Workplace Rights and Illegal Immigration:
How Implied Repeal Analysis Cuts Through the Haze of Hoffman Plastic, Its Predecessors and
Its Progeny, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 49–50 (2008) (summarizing the argument
over administrative competence).
97. Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 47 (1942).
98. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 60 n.21 (1974) (noting
that Congress charged courts with bringing “ultimate resolution” to discrimination
claims). Although employees can file charges with the EEOC and DOL, Title VII
and the FLSA rely primarily on private enforcement in court. Charnesky, supra note
76, at 382–83.
99. See, e.g., Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1068 (9th Cir. 2004)
(discussing judicial competence in Title VII cases).
100. See Ivy C. Lee & Mie Lewis, Human Trafficking from a Legal Advocate’s
Perspective: History, Legal Framework and Current Anti-Trafficking Efforts, 10 U.C. DAVIS J.
INT’L L. & POL’Y 169, 179–81 (2003) (describing the criteria human trafficking
victims must meet in order to receive T-visas).
101. See Eric Schnapper, Righting Wrongs Against Immigrant Workers, 39 TRIAL 46,
47–48 (2003) (noting that judges routinely balance competing interests when
formulating equitable relief).
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102

lower court’s determination than it did to the NLRB’s. The Court
would still have evaluated two federal laws in conflict and formulated
103
a remedial outcome that alleviated the conflict.
For wage and discrimination cases, the importance of
administrative competence depends on whether courts wish to touch
Hoffman’s heart or surface. On its surface, the decision stands for the
limited proposition that a federal agency charged with prosecuting
labor law violations has no business considering immigration matters.
Because FLSA and Title VII cases do not involve such inexpert agency
determinations, Hoffman is inapposite. On the other hand, courts
may view these cases as presenting a conflict between the federal
104
objectives of controlling the border and regulating the workplace.
If courts adopt the latter position, then the issue of administrative
competence falls away, and other functional considerations
enunciated by the Hoffman Court such as remedial purpose will
become the critical factors in determining the extent of unauthorized
workers’ rights.
C. Remedial Purpose and Statutory Gutting
According to the Supreme Court, when immigration law conflicts
105
with labor law, one federal interest must yield to the other. If labor
law prevails, immigration law is diminished. If immigration law
restricts workplace remedies, labor law is diminished. The issue,
then, is which outcome does less violence to either important federal
interest. According to the Court, awarding backpay to unauthorized
workers undermines the “cornerstone” of immigration enforcement,
while stripping the remedy from the NLRA leaves intact the basic
106
workings of federal labor policy. In essence, the Court found that
restricting backpay would not eviscerate the NLRA, while granting
unauthorized immigrants backpay would significantly damage the
102. See Vu & Schwartz, supra note 96, at 50 (discussing the argument in Hoffman
that the NLRB lacked competence to consider federal immigration goals).
103. See Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 384 F.3d 822, 833 (9th Cir. 2004) (Bea, J.,
dissenting) (rejecting Hoffman’s administrative competence argument). But see
Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 237 n.19 (2d Cir. 2006)
(arguing that Hoffman is limited to cases involving inexpert agency determinations).
104. See Vu & Schwartz, supra note 96, at 50 (criticizing the administrative
competence rationale); see also Matthew S. Panach, Two Wrongs Don’t Make A Right . . .
To Receive Backpay?: The Post-Hoffman Polarity of Escobar and Rivera, 60 ARK. L. REV.
907, 935–36 (2008) (characterizing the argument over agency expertise as
“a distinction without consequence”).
105. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002).
106. See id. at 145, 148 (holding that the NLRA’s “more effective remedies” must
give way to “the practical workings of the immigration laws” (citing Sure-Tan, Inc. v.
NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 904 (1984)).
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INA. This creates what I call a “gutting standard” for evaluating
remedial restrictions in other contexts.
Courts can forbid
unauthorized immigrants from recovering workplace remedies as
long as the limitation does not severely restrict (i.e., “gut”) the
employment law’s ability to achieve its core purposes.
The statutory gutting analysis, which has led to diminished rights in
labor cases, does not support limiting wage and antidiscrimination
laws. Although the Supreme Court determined that restricting labor
remedies would not undermine the goals of the NLRA, the distinct
nature of Title VII and the FLSA require a different outcome. For
example, a backpay limitation would severely hamper Title VII’s
ability to eradicate workplace discrimination. Likewise, restricting
the FLSA’s remedies would undermine the statute’s goal of
improving workplace conditions. In essence, the balance between
immigration law and labor law struck by the Court in its
jurisprudence on unauthorized workers cannot be achieved for wage
and antidiscrimination protections.
1.

The high standard for gutting
The Supreme Court has noted that employers do not “get[] off
scot-free” even though they pay nothing when they fire unauthorized
107
The NLRB can still require
immigrants in violation of the NLRA.
108
employers to post a workplace notice summarizing the misconduct.
In addition, employers are subject to cease and desist orders and
109
In essence,
“significant sanctions” should they violate the orders.
then, prohibiting unauthorized immigrants from recovering backpay
for labor law violations does not “gut” labor law itself.
In order to determine whether the gutting standard announced in
the NLRA context will lead to diminished rights in wage and
discrimination cases, consider the breadth of the backpay restriction
in labor law. Backpay, the only monetary remedy available to victims
110
of discrimination under the NLRA,
is designed primarily to
111
“protect[] and compensat[e] . . . employees.” The Supreme Court
has emphasized the compensatory function of backpay under the

107. Id. at 152; see also Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 904 n.13 (noting the existence of
other remedies that can deter misconduct).
108. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 152.
109. Id.
110. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2006).
111. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 10–11 (1940); see Paul Weiler,
Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 1769, 1787–88 (1983) (noting that the NLRA is “heavily oriented toward the
repair of harm inflicted on individual victims of antiunion action by employers”).

2009] REDEFINING THE RIGHTS OF UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS

1381

NLRA, explicitly rejecting a deterrence rationale. In the touchstone
112
case of Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, the Court stated:
[I]t is not enough to justify the Board’s requirements to say that
they would have the effect of deterring persons from violating the
Act. That argument proves too much, for if such a deterrent effect
is sufficient to sustain an order of the Board, it would be free to set
up any system of penalties which it would deem adequate to that
113
end.
114

Despite criticism of Republic Steel’s strict remedial line, the Court
has never strayed from its admonition that backpay awarded under
the NLRA must primarily compensate, even if it serves an ancillary
deterrence function.
In denying backpay to unauthorized immigrants, the Hoffman
Court undermined the central goal of labor law remedies as defined
115
by Republic Steel:
making victims of discrimination whole.
According to the Hoffman Court, labor law can bear this restriction
because unauthorized immigrants lose only those wages they never
116
could have earned legally. Even if the ban on backpay undermines
the NLRA’s secondary deterrence objective, cease and desist orders
117
can achieve that end.
In sum, the standard for statutory gutting turns on the relative
importance of deterrence and compensation within the remedial
scheme of each employment statute. Workplace protections that are
designed mainly to compensate employees can tolerate a backpay ban
because the restriction only impairs unauthorized immigrants’ ability
to recover compensation they never should have earned. In contrast,
remedial restrictions that lower the price of misconduct for
employers would do far greater harm to workplace protections that
place greater emphasis on preventing illegal behavior.
2.

Gutting antidiscrimination protections
Upon a finding of intentional discrimination, Title VII authorizes
courts to award backpay, front pay, compensatory damages, punitive

112. 311 U.S. 7 (1940).
113. Id. at 12.
114. See, e.g., Weiler, supra note 111, at 1788–90 (discussing deterrence under the
NLRA); Michael Weiner, Can the NLRB Deter Unfair Labor Practices? Reassessing the
Punitive-Remedial Distinction in Labor Law Enforcement, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1579, 1590–94
(2005) (same).
115. Republic Steel, 311 U.S. at 12.
116. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 146–50 (2002).
117. See id. at 152 (noting that employers are subject to cease and desist orders
even without backpay); Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 904 n.13 (1984)
(same).
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damages, reinstatement, attorneys’ fees, and injunctive relief.
Courts are unlikely to strip any monetary remedy other than
119
backpay from unauthorized immigrants. Compensatory damages
for emotional distress, punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees remain
available because they do not constitute “wages that could not
120
lawfully have been earned.”
In contrast, reinstatement orders
would force employers to hire unauthorized immigrants in violation
121
of the IRCA, thus precluding the remedy.
Those who support diminished rights take what I call an “antigutting” view of backpay restrictions in Title VII cases. Under this
approach, Title VII can tolerate diminished rights because the loss of
backpay leaves Title VII plaintiffs with a near-complete remedial
122
arsenal.
According to the anti-gutting view, if the Hoffman Court
could eliminate backpay—the only monetary remedy available to the
NLRB—without gutting the NLRA, then certainly Title VII would
123
maintain its vigor following a ban on backpay.
The anti-gutting view assumes incorrectly that backpay occupies
identical roles within the remedial schemes of Title VII and the
NLRA. At first glance, the language of the two statutes appears to
support this reading. The NLRA authorizes the NLRB “to take such
affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or
124
without backpay, as will effectuate the policies of this subchapter.”
Under Title VII, a court may “order such affirmative action as may be
appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement
125
or hiring of employees, with or without back pay.”
Congress
modeled Title VII’s remedial language after the NLRA, and courts
118. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a(a)(1), 2000e-5(g)(1), (k) (2006).
119. For purposes of evaluating unauthorized workers’ Title VII remedies, I treat
“front pay” as conceptually identical to backpay given that both remedies involve
compensation for a worker’s lost employment. See Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 846–50 (2001) (noting that backpay represents lost
earnings from the time of discharge to judgment, while front pay represents lost
earnings from the time of judgment to reinstatement).
120. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 149. At oral argument, Hoffman’s counsel agreed that
compensatory damages would remain available in Title VII cases because they are
“not dependent on the victims [sic] authorization to work in this country.”
Transcript of Oral Argument at *19–20, Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB,
535 U.S. 137 (2002) (No. 00-15952002), 2002 WL 77224.
121. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(2) (2006); see Griffith, supra note 28, at 130 n.26 (noting
that court-ordered reinstatement would force employers to violate the IRCA).
122. See, e.g., Craig Robert Senn, Proposing a Uniform Remedial Approach for
Undocumented Workers Under Federal Employment Discrimination Law, 77 FORDHAM L. REV.
113, 173 (2008) (arguing that even without backpay, Title VII remedies are “far more
substantial” than the limited equitable remedies left by Hoffman).
123. Id.
124. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2006).
125. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2006).
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126

have relied on the NLRA to define backpay under Title VII. Given
these parallels, it might appear perfectly logical to conclude that the
loss of backpay under the NLRA should require the same outcome in
Title VII cases.
Such an analysis, however, ignores the crucial role backpay plays in
achieving Title VII’s prophylactic objective, as compared to the
NLRA. Although the NLRB cannot formulate backpay awards with
127
the specific goal of preventing misconduct, the Supreme Court has
stated that Title VII remedies should primarily deter and that backpay
128
serves that end.
The distinct nature of backpay under Title VII
raises two critical issues: (1) whether courts can achieve the statute’s
deterrence objective without backpay; and, if not, (2) whether the
loss of the deterrence objective would harm Title VII any more
fundamentally than Hoffman harmed the NLRA. Fortunately, the
129
Prior to the Civil
Supreme Court has answered these questions.
130
Rights Act of 1991 (CRA), backpay and attorneys’ fees were the only
131
monetary recoveries available to Title VII plaintiffs. In the pre-CRA
132
case of Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, the Court considered how a loss
of backpay would affect Title VII:
If employers faced only the prospect of an injunctive order, they
would have little incentive to shun practices of dubious legality. It
is the reasonably certain prospect of a backpay award that
provide[s] the spur or catalyst which causes employers and unions
to self-examine and to self-evaluate their employment
133
practices . . . .

According to Albemarle, backpay awards are crucial to achieving
134
In contrast,
Title VII’s primary objective of deterring misconduct.
backpay is not needed under the NLRA because of the law’s ancillary
126. Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 853 (2001);
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419 (1975).
127. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 11–12 (1940).
128. See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 545 (1999) (“[Title VII’s]
primary objective is a prophylactic one; it aims, chiefly, not to provide redress but to
avoid harm.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805–06 (1998) (noting that the main objective of Title VII
is to prevent the harm of unlawful employment discrimination).
129. See Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 417–18 (maintaining that backpay has a
significant deterrent effect on employers, and that, without it, they would have little
incentive to avoid illegal practices).
130. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
131. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1), (k) (2006); David J. Willbrand, Comment, Better
Late Than Never? The Function and Role of After-Acquired Evidence in Employment
Discrimination Litigation, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 617, 623 (1996).
132. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
133. Id. at 417 (internal quotation marks omitted).
134. Id. at 417–18.
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deterrence objectives. The Hoffman Court addressed this point
explicitly, holding that the “spur and catalyst” provided by backpay in
Title VII cases can be achieved through non-monetary remedies
135
under the NLRA.
Unfortunately, given subsequent changes to Title VII’s remedial
landscape, Albemarle provides only limited guidance to the current
debate. The decision was written at a time when backpay and
attorneys’ fees were the only monetary recoveries available to Title
VII plaintiffs. When Congress enacted the CRA, it found that
“additional remedies under Federal law [were] needed to deter
unlawful harassment and intentional discrimination in the
136
workplace.” Under an anti-gutting view (which holds that backpay
restrictions would not fundamentally harm Title VII), the CRA
substituted compensatory and punitive damages for backpay as the
primary means for achieving deterrence.
The availability of
compensatory and punitive damages “serve[s] as a necessary
deterrent to future acts of discrimination, both for those held liable
137
for damages as well as the employer community as a whole.”
Accordingly, those who support diminished rights argue that
138
removing backpay would not gut Title VII at all. Rather, the threat
of having to pay large sums of compensatory and punitive damages
serves Title VII’s prophylactic aims even in the absence of backpay
139
awards.
Although the anti-gutting argument provides some intuitive
appeal, it relies on a flawed reading of legislative history. The
purpose of adding compensatory and punitive damages to Title VII
was to supplement, rather than to supplant, backpay in order to deter
140
misconduct.
Congress believed that the threat of Title VII’s entire
complement of remedies would most effectively prevent potential
141
acts of discrimination.
135. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 152 (2002)
(citing Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 904 (1984)).
136. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 2, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (emphasis added).
137. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I), at 69 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 607.
138. See, e.g., Senn, supra note 122, at 172–73 (adopting an anti-gutting view of
backpay limitations in Title VII cases).
139. See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 545 (1999) (stating that Title
VII is designed “chiefly[] not to provide redress but to avoid harm” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
140. See Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 852 (2001)
(noting that Congress intended the new remedies to supplement the remedies
previously available under Title VII).
141. See Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1067 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussing
deterrence under Title VII).
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The fact that Congress intended backpay to work in conjunction
with compensatory and punitive damages, however, does not
necessarily lead to equalized rights in Title VII cases. It is just as clear
that Congress intended to extend backpay and reinstatement to
victims of labor law discrimination. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court
believed that a backpay restriction would not fundamentally
142
undermine the NLRA.
Thus, the question is not whether
eliminating backpay would weaken Title VII’s ability to achieve its
deterrence objective—it would. The question is whether restricting
backpay would gut Title VII altogether.
Proponents of diminished rights in Title VII cases argue that the
“potentially lucrative remedies” of compensatory and punitive
143
damages alone will effectively deter future Title VII violations.
The functional reality of Title VII litigation, however, suggests
otherwise. Compensatory and punitive damages are not available for
144
disparate impact claims; therefore, a backpay limitation would
completely gut Title VII in these cases. Even for plaintiffs claiming
disparate treatment, backpay is often the only remedy available.
An employer’s conduct may not constitute the kind of malice or
145
reckless indifference necessary to warrant punitive damages.
Compensatory damages for the embarrassment, humiliation, and
emotional distress caused by an employer’s discriminatory acts can be
146
intangible and difficult to prove. Although the Albemarle Court held
that the “reasonably certain prospect of a backpay award” discourages
illegal conduct, the speculative nature of compensatory and punitive
147
damages cannot have the same effect.
Finally, injunctive relief—the centerpiece of Hoffman’s claim that
employers do not “get off ‘scot-free’”—will rarely be available to
unauthorized immigrants who sue under Title VII for intentional
148
discrimination.
The IRCA bars unauthorized immigrants from

142. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 152 (2002).
143. See Senn, supra note 122, at 172–73 (arguing that a backpay limitation leaves
victims of discrimination with other effective remedies).
144. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (2006) (limiting compensatory and punitive
damages to cases of intentional discrimination); see also Panach, supra note 104, at
947–48 (discussing remedies available in disparate impact cases).
145. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (2006).
146. See Ho & Chang, supra note 22, at 513 n.190 (describing emotional distress
injuries as “notoriously intangible”).
147. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975).
148. See Schnapper, supra note 101, at 48 (“For an undocumented alien, monetary
relief will usually be the only possible remedy.”).
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149

receiving reinstatement, and courts have refused to grant injunctive
150
relief to Title VII plaintiffs who fail to seek reinstatement.
Reduced to its functional reality, a ban on backpay would leave
unauthorized immigrants with no viable remedy in most Title VII
cases. This outcome severely curtails the effective enforcement of
antidiscrimination protections in the workplace—norms that benefit
unauthorized workers and citizens alike.
Hoffman is less concerned with how remedial limitations harm
unauthorized immigrants than with the damage done to the
workplace protection at issue. The Hoffman Court found that
national labor goals could be achieved even if certain employees were
151
barred from recovering backpay. The same cannot be said of Title
VII. If the price of discrimination fluctuates based on a plaintiff’s
immigration status, Title VII cannot effectively deter employers from
engaging in illegal conduct.
3.

Gutting wage protections
Scholars generally share the view that Hoffman will not diminish
152
unauthorized workers’ ability to assert FLSA claims.
Nearly every
judge to rule on the issue has agreed, holding that unauthorized
153
immigrants remain covered by wage protections. These courts note
that backpay under the FLSA represents wages for work already
performed, while backpay under the NLRA represents wages for work
154
never performed because of an illegal discharge.
Although
accurate, the distinction fails to explain why the former type of loss
should be compensated while the latter should not. As explained
below, an analysis based on statutory gutting provides a clearer basis
for immunizing the FLSA from remedial limitations than a critique
based on different statutory definitions of “backpay.”

149. See Griffith, supra note 28, at 130 n.26 (discussing reinstatement of
unauthorized workers).
150. See, e.g., Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251, 265 (3d Cir. 2001) (denying
plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief); Carmichael v. Birmingham Saw Works, 738
F.2d 1126, 1136 (11th Cir. 1984) (same).
151. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 152 (2002).
152. See Rebecca Smith et al., Low Pay, High Risk: State Models for Advancing
Immigrant Workers’ Rights, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 597, 606 (2004) (noting
that immigrant advocates are concerned about Hoffman’s effect on Title VII, not the
FLSA); Seitz, supra note 23, at 407–08 (same).
153. See Part I (discussing post-Hoffman decisions involving wage and discrimination
claims).
154. See, e.g., Chellen v. John Pickle Co., 446 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1277 (N.D. Okla.
2006); Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 295, 323 (D.N.J. 2005);
Galaviz-Zamora v. Brady Farms, Inc., 230 F.R.D. 499, 501–03 (W.D. Mich. 2005);
Reyes v. Van Elk, Ltd., 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 68, 70 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).
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Backpay protects different interests, depending on the
employment protection at issue. Under Title VII and the NLRA,
backpay most commonly compensates employees for “lost future
155
earnings” —i.e., remunerable work lost because of an illegal
156
Under the FLSA, backpay compensates employees for
discharge.
157
The Hoffman Court refused “to award
wages earned but not paid.
158
backpay to an illegal alien for years of work not performed.”
Because plaintiffs in FLSA actions have already performed work,
advocates assert that Hoffman is inapplicable to such cases. Although
this is a sound basis to distinguish the facts of Hoffman from specific
FLSA actions, the significance of the distinction remains unclear.
In fact, even in cases involving lost work, such as an illegal discharge
under the NLRA or Title VII, “backpay” compensates an employee
for a cognizable loss, and a court that denies the remedy leaves a
plaintiff less than whole.
FLSA plaintiffs undoubtedly suffer a tangible loss when they work
for an employer without pay. But employees fired for union
organizing also suffer a tangible harm: lost work due to the
159
employer’s anti-union animus.
Consistent with this principle,
courts limit backpay awards under the NLRA to the employee’s actual
160
Just as a plaintiff’s right to recover backpay under the FLSA
loss.
accrues when an employer fails to tender compensation for work
performed, the employee’s right to recover backpay under the NLRA
accrues when she is unemployed and seeking work following an
161
illegal discharge. By the time either employee appears in court, she
has suffered a definite injury (unpaid work or unemployment). If the
employee in the labor context can be left less than whole, why not the
plaintiff who has worked without pay?
Perhaps the past work/lost work distinction carries more force
when viewed from the perspective of the employer. It might appear
that the FLSA violator enjoys a windfall of unpaid labor, while the
155. Griffith, supra note 28, at 130.
156. Smith et al., supra note 152, at 606.
157. See, e.g., id. (distinguishing between the two types of backpay); Vu & Schwartz,
supra note 96, at 45–46 (same).
158. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 149 (2002).
159. See Ruben J. Garcia, Ghost Workers in an Interconnected World: Going Beyond the
Dichotomies of Domestic Immigration and Labor Laws, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 737, 749–
50 (2003) (noting that backpay serves as a proxy for the wages an employee would
have earned in the absence of discrimination).
160. See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 198 (1941) (noting that all
mitigating factors should be taken into account).
161. Anne Marie O’Donovan, Immigrant Workers and Workers’ Compensation After
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 299,
312–13 (2006).
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NLRA violator does not. But employers who commit unfair labor
practices without having to pay for them enjoy “ill-gotten gains” as
162
The employer who violates the NLRA normally pays a price
well.
for the “benefit” of illegal discrimination in the form of backpay.
If this price is reduced to zero, the employer can discriminate for
free, putting him at a comparative advantage over nondiscriminating
employers. Put another way, the NLRA diminishes a perfectly at-will
relationship by reducing employers’ freedom to hire and fire whom
they please. Employers who violate the NLRA without cost enjoy
greater freedom in making employment decisions.
If courts
eliminate backpay, the FLSA violator enjoys free labor and the NLRA
violator enjoys free discrimination.
In comparison to the past work/lost work distinction, statutory
gutting provides a more persuasive basis for preventing diminished
rights in wage cases. The FLSA was designed to combat Depressionera wages by establishing minimum working standards that are
163
“remedial, with a humanitarian end in view.”
Those who support
diminished rights might argue that remedial limitations under the
FLSA are no different than restricting backpay under the NLRA—
another workplace protection with a compensatory remedial scheme.
Whether the unauthorized worker asserts a claim under the FLSA or
NLRA, he seeks to recover “wages that could not lawfully have been
earned . . . [from] a job obtained in the first instance by a criminal
164
fraud.”
But the argument in favor of diminished rights ignores the
difference between an employment statute’s remedial scheme and its
substantive purpose. The two are one and the same for the FLSA, but
not for the NLRA. Although backpay under the NLRA is designed to
serve compensatory ends in order to combat discrimination, the
statute’s primary function is to encourage collective bargaining
165
through voluntary agreements.
In fact, the Supreme Court has
explicitly barred the NLRB from imposing substantive working
166
The remedy of backpay—
conditions on employers and unions.
though undoubtedly compensatory in nature—ultimately serves the

162. See Rogers v. Loether, 467 F.2d 1110, 1121 (7th Cir. 1972) (“The retention of
‘wages’ which would have been paid but for the statutory violation (of improper
discharge) might well be considered ‘ill-gotten gains’; ultimate payment restores the
situation to that which would have existed had the statute not been violated.”).
163. See Charnesky, supra note 76, at 393–94 (quoting Fleming v. Hawkeye Pearl
Button Co., 113 F.2d 52, 56 (8th Cir. 1940)) (discussing the FLSA’s goals).
164. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 148–49 (2002).
165. NLRB v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 401–02 (1952).
166. Id. at 402; Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 10–11 (1940).
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NLRA’s procedural goal of encouraging self-organization and
167
collective bargaining.
In contrast, the FLSA’s remedies directly support the statute’s
substantive purpose, which is to improve working conditions by
setting overtime and minimum wage rates. Thus, although the
Supreme Court tolerated diminished rights in NLRA cases on the
assumption that the objectives of national labor policy could be
achieved even without backpay, the same is not true for wage
protections. The connection between the FLSA’s remedial scheme
and its statutory purpose is evinced by the nondiscretionary nature of
backpay under the FLSA, as compared to Title VII and the NLRA.
Although the latter statutes leave backpay determinations to the
168
equitable discretion of the courts, the remedy is mandatory under
169
the FLSA. Thus, the FLSA leaves no room for any type of Hoffmaninspired balancing between federal labor and immigration objectives.
A court that evaluates the effect that an award of unpaid wages would
have on immigration-related incentives simply ignores the mandatory
nature of the remedy under the FLSA. Thus, eliminating backpay
under the FLSA would not only undermine the statute’s ability to
attain its stated purpose, it would blot out explicit statutory text
requiring the remedy upon a finding of liability.
The few judges who have argued in favor of denying unauthorized
immigrants the ability to recover minimum wages fail to address the
170
issue of statutory gutting. Rather than focus on the harm done to
wage laws when backpay is denied, they focus on the harm done to
immigration laws when backpay is awarded. Under this view, allowing
unauthorized immigrants to recover unpaid wages trivializes the
171
IRCA and encourages new border violations. But an approach that
167. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006); see also NLRB v. Fin. Inst. Employees of Am., Local
1182, 475 U.S. 192, 208 (1986) (noting that the NLRA is designed to preserve
industrial peace); Ho & Chang, supra note 22, at 509–10 (arguing that the NLRA’s
procedural framework is not designed to achieve substantive goals in bargaining).
168. See Willbrand, supra note 131, at 642 n.152 (discussing mandatory and
permissive nature of backpay awards under different statutes). Compare 29 U.S.C.
§ 216(b) (2006) (“shall” in the FLSA), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2006) (“may”
in Title VII), and 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2006) (“may” in the NLRA).
169. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006).
170. See, e.g., In re Reyes, 814 F.2d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 1987) (Jones, J., dissenting)
(discussing the immigration-related justifications for denying unauthorized
immigrants the ability to recover unpaid wages); Patel v. Sumani Corp., 660 F. Supp.
1528, 1531 (N.D. Ala. 1987), rev’d sub nom. Patel v. Quality Inn S., 846 F.2d 700
(11th Cir. 1988) (holding that the FLSA’s wage protections conflict with the INA);
Ulloa v. Al’s All Tree Serv., Inc., 768 N.Y.S.2d 556, 558 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 2003) (noting
in dicta that “Hoffman would require that the wage claim be disallowed in its
entirety”).
171. In re Reyes, 814 F.2d at 172 (Jones, J., dissenting); Ulloa, 768 N.Y.S.2d at 558.
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fails to consider the effect remedial limitations have on workplace
protections ignores Hoffman’s central point. The Supreme Court
limited remedies in NLRA cases precisely because labor law would
remain relatively unblemished in the wake of such losses. A different
outcome is required in wage cases, however, because stripping
backpay from the FLSA is equivalent to eliminating the FLSA itself.
III. INCENTIVES FOR ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION
The future rights of unauthorized workers will depend not only on
the functional concerns discussed above, but also on the impact
equalized rights have on immigration policy. In its jurisprudence on
unauthorized workers, the Supreme Court has considered whether
extending employment protections encourages illegal immigration.
The Sure-Tan and Hoffman Courts approached the subject from very
different vantages and, not surprisingly, came to different results.
In Sure-Tan, the Court focused almost exclusively on the employer172
related incentives created by denying coverage under the NLRA.
The Court stated:
If an employer realizes that there will be no advantage under the
NLRA in preferring illegal aliens to legal resident workers, any
incentive to hire such illegal aliens is correspondingly lessened. In
turn, if the demand for undocumented aliens declines, there may
then be fewer incentives for aliens themselves to enter in violation
173
of the federal immigration laws.

Under the Sure-Tan Court’s approach, an employee’s incentive to
immigrate is subordinate to the more important factors that
influence an employer’s hiring decisions. A business will be less likely
to employ an unauthorized worker who can assert claims for
workplace violations; the drop in employer demand created by
equalized rights will have the secondary effect of impacting the
immigration-related decisions of foreign nationals. By diminishing
174
an immigrant’s exploitability, work law serves immigration law.
Hoffman moves from an employer-based framework to one
centered on the choices made by unauthorized immigrants.
The employee in Hoffman admitted to tendering false documents in
175
order to obtain employment.
Awarding the employee backpay
172. 467 U.S. 883, 893–94 (1984).
173. Id.
174. Although the Supreme Court considered whether a backpay award would
cause the five Sure-Tan workers to cross the border illegally, id. at 893–94, the Court
never engaged in a broad analysis of immigration-related incentives from the
perspective of immigrants generally.
175. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 141 (2002).
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“would encourage the successful evasion of apprehension by
immigration authorities, condone prior violations of the immigration
176
According to the Hoffman
laws, and encourage future violations.”
Court, a ban on backpay discourages immigrants from crossing the
177
border, obtaining employment, and remaining in the country.
Both Sure-Tan and Hoffman rely on the questionable assumption
that employment law remedies impact the stakeholders’ incentives.
Causes that more directly affect illegal immigration include poverty
178
179
in countries of origin, globalization, and underenforcement of
180
the IRCA. Unauthorized immigrants rarely know their employment
181
If they are willing to risk injury and death to come to the
rights.
United States, the Supreme Court’s decisions will not dampen their
determination.
In contrast to the negligible effect they have on a noncitizen’s
decision to immigrate illegally, changes in employment law could
theoretically alter an employer’s calculus. Congress focused on
182
employer conduct when it designed the IRCA.
Believing that
183
“[e]mployment is the magnet that attracts aliens here illegally,”
Congress attempted to diminish employers’ economic incentives to
hire unauthorized immigrants through the IRCA’s work verification
184
system.
Both the Sure-Tan Court and the IRCA attempted to raise
176. Id. at 151.
177. See id. (holding that awarding backpay would encourage illegal border
crossing).
178. See Linda S. Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership: The Dual Identity of the
Undocumented Worker Under United States Law, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 955, 990 (1988)
(describing American demand for low-wage, low-skilled labor as one of many causes
of illegal immigration); Lori A. Nessel, Undocumented Immigrants in the Workplace:
The Fallacy of Labor Protections and the Need for Reform, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 345,
358 (2001) (discussing economic disparities between the United States and sending
countries).
179. See Nessel, supra note 178, at 358 (discussing global factors influencing
international migration).
180. See Jarod S. Gonzalez, Employment Law Remedies for Illegal Immigrants, 40 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 987, 997 (2008) (discussing the need for greater enforcement of the
IRCA).
181. See Ontiveros, supra note 86, at 630 (challenging the contention that
workplace protections encourage unauthorized immigrants to come to the United
States).
182. See Catherine L. Fisk & Michael J. Wishnie, The Story of Hoffman Plastic
Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB: Labor Rights Without Remedies for Undocumented Immigrants,
in LABOR LAW STORIES 399, 406 (Laura J. Cooper & Catherine L. Fisk eds., 2005)
(discussing the IRCA’s focus on punishing employers that hire unauthorized
immigrants).
183. H.R. REP. NO. 99-682(I), at 46 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649,
5649–50.
184. See NLRB v. A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, Inc., 134 F.3d 50, 55–58
(2d Cir. 1997) (noting that “IRCA was passed to reduce the incentives for employers
to hire illegal aliens”).
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the costs of hiring unauthorized immigrants—Sure-Tan by extending
labor law protections to all workers and the IRCA by fining employers
who hire unauthorized immigrants.
Given the IRCA’s legislative backdrop and Sure-Tan’s employerbased frame, it is remarkable that the Hoffman Court focused
185
exclusively on the illegal conduct of immigrant employees.
Critiques of Hoffman have failed to account for this crucial analytical
shift from employer- to employee-based incentives. Instead, most
judges and scholars critical of Hoffman argue that backpay limitations
186
increase the likelihood that businesses will hire these employees.
Despite its cogency, the argument fails to provide a basis for limiting
187
The Supreme Court cited but rejected the contention
Hoffman.
that remedial restrictions make unauthorized immigrants relatively
188
more attractive to employers.
Rather, Hoffman focuses on the
choices of immigrants “who themselves ha[ve] committed serious
189
criminal acts.”
It is time to consider the Court’s analytical frame
and examine the role played by employee-based incentives in other
statutory contexts.
A. Rewarding Illegal Behavior
The Supreme Court’s discourse on unauthorized immigrants takes
a decidedly moralistic tone when workplace rights are at issue.
Hoffman speaks of “condon[ing]” unauthorized immigrants’ past
190
crimes.
Rather than discussing the employer’s admitted unfair
labor practices, Hoffman elaborates on the employee’s “criminal
191
fraud.”
Granting backpay to such a worker would “reward[]” his
192
past misbehavior.

185. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 149 (2002).
186. See, e.g., Flores v. Limehouse, No. 2:04-1295-CWH, 2006 WL 1328762, at *2
(D.S.C. May 11, 2006) (arguing that a ban on backpay provides employers with
“incentives to hire unauthorized aliens thereby defeating IRCA’s purpose of
reducing employment opportunities for unauthorized aliens”); Reyes v. Van Elk,
Ltd., 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 68, 77 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (noting that employers often know
when they are hiring unauthorized immigrants); Cameron, supra note 61, at 31–32
(noting that a backpay limitation likely invokes fear of deportation in undocumented
workers and precludes them from pursuing actions against employers); Ho & Chang,
supra note 22, at 489–90 (discussing employers’ incentives to hire unauthorized
immigrants).
187. See Vu & Schwartz, supra note 96, at 43 (“Seeing as this logic has been
considered and rejected by the Court, restating it cannot serve as a valid way to
distinguish Hoffman.”).
188. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 152.
189. Id. at 143.
190. Id. at 151.
191. Id. at 149.
192. Id. at 145.
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The first step in deciding whether backpay under Title VII or the
FLSA might constitute a similar reward is to determine the specific
illegal behavior at issue in Hoffman. When the Hoffman Court wrote
193
about condoning Jose Castro’s “serious misconduct,” exactly what
misconduct was the Court seeking to curb? If the objectionable
behavior was Mr. Castro’s unauthorized presence in the United
States, then the rewards rationale could apply broadly to
unauthorized immigrants asserting wage and discrimination claims as
well. The INA permits the removal of foreign nationals who have
entered the United States without inspection or overstayed their visas,
194
among other grounds.
By definition, an unauthorized immigrant
who sues under Title VII or the FLSA has committed some sort of
195
INA violation.
If he continues to stay in the country while
prosecuting workplace claims, he successfully evades apprehension by
196
Thus, the most expansive view of the
immigration authorities.
rewards rationale would bar claims brought by any person present in
the country illegally.
But there is little support for such a wide reading of the Court’s
discourse on incentives. Nothing in the case law suggests that
unauthorized immigrants should be denied access to courts, and
Hoffman itself assumes the continued coverage of unauthorized
197
immigrants under the NLRA.
The Hoffman Court focused not on
Mr. Castro’s illegal presence in the United States, but on “a legal
198
The Court
landscape now significantly changed” by the IRCA.
stated, “IRCA forcefully made combating the employment of illegal
199
aliens central to [t]he policy of immigration law.”
Thus, it was
Mr. Castro’s document fraud (and not his illegal presence) that was
200
the primary focus of the Court’s rewards critique.
If an unauthorized immigrant obtains employment in the same way
as Mr. Castro and proceeds to sue under Title VII or the FLSA,
193. Id. at 146.
194. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2006) (listing various classes of deportable aliens);
see also Legomsky, supra note 25, at 487, 499 (2007) (discussing immigration-related
violations).
195. Many unauthorized immigrants—up to forty percent of the population—
commit the non-criminal INA violation of overstaying their visa. PASSEL, supra note 1,
at 1; Smith et al., supra note 152, at 625 n.184.
196. See Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 149 (expressing concern that “alien-employee[s]
would . . . successfully evad[e] apprehension by immigration authorities”).
197. See Schnapper, supra note 101, at 49 (arguing against Hoffman’s application to
other claims); see also supra Part III.C (discussing the “wider lens” of incentives).
198. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 147.
199. Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted).
200. See id. at 149 (discussing the importance of the employment verification
system).
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similar rewards concerns are present. For example, a backpay award
given to an unauthorized immigrant who is the victim of racial
discrimination could be viewed as sanctioning the plaintiff’s illegal
use of documents to obtain employment in the first instance.
The analysis might change if a plaintiff’s culpability were less than
Mr. Castro’s or an employer’s culpability were greater than the
employer in Hoffman. The IRCA forbids immigrants from obtaining
201
employment fraudulently and employers from knowingly hiring
202
Hoffman involved a guilty-worker/innocentthese workers.
employer scenario because Mr. Castro tendered fraudulent
203
documents without Hoffman’s knowledge. But what if an employer
knowingly hires an unauthorized worker? Several judges and
commentators have argued that a diminished rights outcome should
204
not occur in cases involving such “guilty employers.” There are two
possible guilty-employer scenarios, one involving an innocent job
applicant and one in which both parties commit document fraud
together. Consistent with the rewards rationale, employers who
engage in document fraud alone should not receive backpay
immunity. The cases the Hoffman Court relied on to strike labor
remedies for unauthorized workers involved employees who
205
committed crimes at worksites.
In an innocent-worker/guiltyemployer scenario, there is no employee misconduct to reward; only
the employer has violated the IRCA.
But the innocent-worker/guilty-employer scenario is somewhat
unusual. The IRCA prohibits an employer from knowingly hiring an
unauthorized immigrant, failing to review a job applicant’s
paperwork, and continuing to employ a worker with the knowledge
206
that she is an unauthorized immigrant. The only situation in which
a worker is “innocent” and an employer is “guilty” occurs when a
business fails to request any paperwork from a new hire
201. 8 U.S.C. § 1324c (2006).
202. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2006).
203. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 141.
204. See, e.g., Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 236–37
(2d Cir. 2006) (attempting to limit Hoffman based on the guilty-employer
distinction); Singh v. Jutla, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1061–62 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (same);
O’Donovan, supra note 161, at 315–16 (arguing that backpay immunity should apply
only to unknowing employers); Senn, supra note 122, at 158–59 (contending that
Congress intended only to punish undocumented workers who obtained work
through fraudulent means); Wishnie, supra note 10, at 511–12 (discussing the guiltyemployer distinction).
205. See Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 46–47 (1942) (denying
reinstatement to employees who violated a federal mutiny statute); NLRB v. Fansteel
Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 257–58 (1939) (denying reinstatement to
employees who engaged in an illegal seizure of a building).
206. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2006).
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(the employee does not violate the IRCA here because she has not
207
But the IRCA’s structure
tendered fraudulent documents).
provides employers with few incentives to ignore documents
altogether. Employers can hire unauthorized workers and comply
with the IRCA by simply accepting social security cards that appear
208
genuine.
The relative ease of compliance means that even
employers who seek to hire unauthorized immigrants will be much
more likely to give a cursory review of employee-provided paperwork
209
rather than fail to ask for documents at all.
If both parties commit document fraud, courts face the choice of
rewarding the employee’s misconduct with backpay or rewarding the
employer’s IRCA violation with backpay immunity. By extending the
backpay limitation to knowing employers, courts would create a
direct incentive to hire unauthorized immigrants. Employers would
weigh the reduction in employment liability gained by hiring
unauthorized workers against the risk of IRCA fines. Given the
210
improbability of actual prosecution by immigration authorities,
many employers might seek to hire unauthorized workers as an
explicit management strategy. The moral hazard created by granting
backpay immunity to guilty employers (even when employees also
violate the IRCA) would pose a direct threat to the system of work
verification that the Supreme Court has characterized as “crucial” to
211
national immigration policy.
B. Encouraging Future Violations
Although Hoffman’s rewards rationale speaks of “condon[ing] prior
212
violations,”
the decision has a future-oriented bent as well.
A reward for past misconduct creates incentives for other immigrants
213
to violate immigration laws. By limiting backpay under the NLRA,

207. See Linton Joaquin & Charles Wheeler, Document Fraud Enforcement the Second
Time Around: Will the Right Lessons Be Learned?, 78 INTERPRETER RELEASES 473, 474
(Mar. 12, 2001) (discussing IRCA violations).
208. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1)(A) (2006).
209. See Collins Foods Int’l, Inc. v. INS, 948 F.2d 549, 554 (9th Cir. 1991)
(recognizing congressional intent to make the verification process relatively easy for
employers).
210. See Gonzalez, supra note 180, at 997 (discussing the low number of sanctions
imposed on employers for violations of the IRCA).
211. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147–48 (2002);
see also Schnapper, supra note 101, at 47 (arguing against extending backpay
immunity to knowing employers).
212. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 151 (emphasis added).
213. Id. at 150 (recognizing that “awarding backpay . . . condones and encourages
future violations”); see also Martinez, supra note 54, at 677–78 (discussing the
application of the Supreme Court’s incentives-based rationales in later cases).
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the Supreme Court has attempted to discourage several types of
misconduct, including entering the country illegally, evading
apprehension once inside the country, and obtaining new
214
employment through additional IRCA violations.
As explained
below, restricting remedies in wage and discrimination cases will not
discourage any of the three behaviors the Supreme Court sought to
curtail.
Consider the incentive to immigrate illegally. The Hoffman Court
created a fiction whereby the denial of remedies under the NLRA
would discourage people from immigrating illegally. Given all of the
factors driving a person’s decision to immigrate to the United States,
the Court could not actually have believed that the speculative hope
of recovering backpay from a labor law violation would alter an
immigrant’s calculus. The same fiction applies to Title VII. Foreign
nationals do not immigrate to the country illegally in order to win
215
sexual harassment lawsuits.
The goal of discouraging border violations is only slightly less
unrealistic in the FLSA context. Given immigrants’ desire for higherpaying jobs, a loss of the federal minimum wage might dissuade a few
216
people from entering the United States illegally.
But this is a
questionable assumption given that unauthorized immigrants who
currently enjoy minimum wage protections rarely assert this right
217
even when they are paid below required levels. With the ability to
earn wages in the United States that are up to ten times higher than
in Mexico and Central America, unauthorized immigrants might still
find American workplaces attractive even without minimum wage
218
protections. Therefore, to have any real impact on border-crossing
incentives, average wage rates for unauthorized immigrants would
have to fall well below federally defined floors.
Just as they fail to influence a worker’s decision to cross the border
illegally, employment law remedies create no incentive to seek
214. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 150–52; see Seitz, supra note 23, at 396 (discussing the
Hoffman Court’s contention that backpay awards incentivize further illegal activity).
215. See Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 155 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
possibility of future backpay awards does not create an incentive to immigrate);
see also Griffith, supra note 28, at 136 (criticizing Hoffman’s incentives analysis).
216. See Neil A. Friedman, A Human Rights Approach to the Labor Rights of
Undocumented Workers, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1715, 1742 (1986) (arguing that unauthorized
immigrants are not likely to “base their immigration decisions on legal niceties”).
217. See Bosniak, supra note 178, at 986 (discussing unauthorized immigrants’
unwillingness to assert workplace claims); William B. Gould IV, Labor Law and Its
Limits: Some Proposals for Reform, 49 WAYNE L. REV. 667, 669 (2003) (describing
immigrants who assert workplace claims following Hoffman as “audacious”).
218. Sylvia R. Lazos, Emerging Latina/o Nation and Anti-Immigrant Backlash, 7 NEV.
L.J. 685, 695 n.68 (2007).
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employment following an illegal discharge.
Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court’s incentives-based rationale assumes that immigrants’
mitigation efforts encourage them to obtain additional work, thereby
219
triggering more IRCA violations.
The Court’s reading of the mitigation principle is wrong both as a
matter of theory and practice. There is no “duty” to mitigate in that
plaintiffs who fail to mitigate are not exposed to liability or barred
220
from asserting their claims. Rather, employers have the burden of
proving an employee’s failure to mitigate and can limit a plaintiff’s
recovery by carrying this burden. Courts reduce backpay awards by
the wages an employee earned or should have earned following
221
termination. Under this standard method for calculating backpay,
an employee’s recovery should be exactly the same whether or not
222
she obtains new employment because her award is reduced by the
amount she earns in reality or earns hypothetically with reasonable
223
diligence.
Although the Court is correct that unauthorized immigrants will
224
likely obtain new employment following illegal discharges, the
incentive flows from their need to replace wages, not from the
225
mitigation principle.
Most unauthorized immigrants earn
219. See Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 150–51 (“Castro cannot mitigate damages, a duty our
cases require, without triggering new IRCA violations, either by tendering false
documents to employers or by finding employers willing to ignore IRCA and hire
illegal workers.” (citations omitted)).
220. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.12, at 807 (3d ed. 1999) (“[T]he
injured party incurs no liability to the party in breach by failing to take such steps.”);
Howard C. Eglit, Damages Mitigation Doctrine in the Statutory Anti-Discrimination Context:
Mitigating Its Negative Impact, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 9 n.3 (2000) (preferring the term
“mitigation principle”).
221. See, e.g., Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 197–98 (1941)
(reducing backpay by “amounts which the workers failed without excuse to earn”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Fisk & Wishnie, supra note 182, at 404
(discussing mitigation in relation to backpay under the NLRA).
222. See 5 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1039, at 242 (1964) (“[The]
recovery against the defendant will be exactly the same whether [the plaintiff] makes
the effort and mitigates his loss, or not . . . .”).
223. Given the discretionary nature of the remedy, a court may refuse to award
any backpay to employees who do nothing to find replacement work. But this should
occur only if the wages the employees would have earned with reasonable diligence
equal or exceed their actual lost wages. Any reduction beyond that amount would
conflict with the make-whole goal of Title VII and the NLRA. See Ho & Chang, supra
note 22, at 511 (discussing Title VII’s compensatory function).
224. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 150–51.
225. Employees who fail to mitigate properly are distinct from those who make
themselves “unavailable” for work by leaving the labor market. The former group
remains eligible for backpay, less mitigation, while the latter group’s backpay claims
are tolled during the period of unavailability. See, e.g., Miller v. Marsh, 766 F.2d 490,
492 (11th Cir. 1985) (denying backpay after the plaintiff left the job market to attend
law school); Lundy Packing Co., 286 N.L.R.B. 141, 164 (1987) (tolling the plaintiff’s
backpay award for the period of time when the plaintiff was incarcerated);
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226

extremely low wages. If they are fired, these workers will find new
work in order to feed themselves and their families, not out of a
227
desire to properly mitigate losses for a future lawsuit.
The same critique applies in the Title VII context. Title VII’s
backpay limitation states, “Interim earnings or amounts earnable with
reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated against
228
shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable.”
The employer defending a Title VII case must prove that the plaintiff
229
failed to adequately obtain substantially equivalent employment.
But if the employer carries this burden, the plaintiff recovers the
same amount (often nothing) as she would have received had she
230
mitigated properly.
As with the NLRA, Title VII’s mitigation
principle does not encourage an unauthorized immigrant to find new
work because the plaintiff’s post-termination conduct does not affect
231
her backpay recovery.
The incentives created by hypothetical mitigation, tenuous as they
are in labor and discrimination cases, are completely absent in wage
cases because there is no duty to mitigate. A plaintiff seeking unpaid
wages under the FLSA has already performed services and cannot

see also A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. 408, 412 (1995)
(discussing the availability doctrine as it applies to unauthorized immigrants).
The Sure-Tan employees who resided in Mexico had left the American job market
and were unavailable for work. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 904 (1984).
Hoffman did not state whether the unauthorized immigration status of workers
residing in the United States makes them unavailable for work. See Hoffman, 535 U.S.
at 159 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The Court, however, does not rely upon [the
availability doctrine] as determining its conclusion.”).
226. JEFFREY S. PASSEL, UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANTS: NUMBERS AND CHARACTERISTICS
34 (2005), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/46.pdf; see also Francine
J. Lipman, The Taxation of Undocumented Immigrants: Separate, Unequal, and Without
Representation, 9 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 16–17 (2006) (discussing wages of
unauthorized immigrants in relation to national averages).
227. See PASSEL, supra note 226, at 30–35 (illustrating the dynamics of immigrant
families and the demands on unauthorized immigrants as providers for their
families).
228. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
229. Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231 (1982); Hutchison v. Amateur
Elec. Supply, Inc., 42 F.3d 1037, 1044 (7th Cir. 1994).
230. See Booker v. Taylor Milk Co., Inc., 64 F.3d 860, 866 (3d Cir. 1985) (“The
plain language of section 2000e-5 shows that amounts that could have been earned
with reasonable diligence should be used to reduce or decrease a backpay award, not to
wholly cut off the right to any backpay.”). But see Sellers v. Delgado Coll., 902 F.2d
1189, 1196 (5th Cir. 1990) (denying backpay altogether for the plaintiff’s failure to
mitigate).
231. Although a court may be disinclined to award backpay to employees who fail
to search for work, any reduction that exceeds what was reasonably earnable conflicts
with Title VII’s text requiring a “reduction” based on “earnable” wages. See supra
notes 223–230 and accompanying text.
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232

reduce her losses by working for another employer.
The wage
claim does not encourage future violations of the IRCA because the
233
plaintiff is not required to find new work.
In sum, employment law remedies do not cause workers to come to
the United States or stay, despite the Supreme Court’s assumptions
about the factors driving illegal immigration.
C. The Wider Lens of Incentives
The Supreme Court has stated that the goal of discouraging illegal
234
immigration should be seen “through a wider lens.”
Viewed
uncritically, this statement could lead to diminished rights in all
cases.
When courts focus on the “wider lens” of incentives, rather than on
the specific functional and policy-based arguments discussed above,
they often compare unauthorized immigrants’ employment
235
relationships to illegal contracts.
But the comparison ignores the
rules governing the enforcement of illegal contracts. Although
courts generally refuse to give effect to contracts formed with an
illegal purpose, the finding of “illegality” does not end the inquiry.
For example, courts are more likely to enforce illegal contracts when
236
failure to do so would result in disproportionate forfeiture.
Such forfeiture would certainly occur if an unauthorized immigrant
could not recover wages for work performed.
Further, a contract that is made illegal by a particular regulation or
statute may still be enforced if one of the contracting parties is a
237
member of the class of persons protected by the statute. Although
the IRCA bars the employment of unauthorized immigrants,
Congress sought to protect the rights of unauthorized immigrants
238
should they ultimately obtain employment.
Thus, the finding of
232. See Vu & Schwartz, supra note 96, at 47 (noting that FLSA plaintiffs cannot
reduce their losses by obtaining alterative employment).
233. See, e.g., Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 243
(2d Cir. 2006) (noting that a backpay award under the FLSA does not condone
prior immigration violations or continue them); Flores v. Albertsons, Inc.,
No. CV0100515AHM (SHX), 2002 WL 1163623, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2002)
(noting that successful FLSA claims do not cause employees to violate the IRCA).
234. Hoffman Plastics Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002).
235. See, e.g., Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 384 F.3d 822, 833 (9th Cir. 2004) (Bea, J.,
dissenting) (“It is axiomatic that a contract with an illegal purpose bars enforcement
of such contract; no damages are incurred by its breach.” (citations omitted)); Ulloa
v. Al’s All Tree Serv., Inc., 768 N.Y.S.2d 556, 558 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 2003) (stating that an
employment contract with an unauthorized immigrant is “tainted with illegality”).
236. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 197 (1979).
237. Juliet P. Kostritsky, Illegal Contracts and Efficient Deterrence: A Study in Modern
Contract Theory, 74 IOWA L. REV. 115, 156–58 (1988).
238. See Part II.A (discussing the IRCA’s text and history).
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illegality is only the starting point of the analysis, even if a wider lens
is used.
Detached from the language or purpose of the IRCA, the wider
lens approach becomes a Rorschach test for judges. Those strongly
opposed to illegal immigration focus exclusively on the illegality of
239
Because the Supreme Court has
the employment relationship.
announced many factors relevant to cases involving unauthorized
workers without formulating a hierarchy of factors, a plaintiff’s
240
unauthorized status becomes the sole focus of the analysis. Viewed
broadly, the wider lens approach threatens not only the remedy of
backpay, but also the ability of unauthorized workers to assert
workplace claims at all.
Although still among the minority, several judges have utilized a
wider lens to argue that unauthorized workers should enjoy fewer
241
242
rights under federal wage and antidiscrimination statutes. These
outcomes contradict most post-Hoffman decisions that continue to
243
favor unauthorized workers’ rights and remedies. They also ignore
Hoffman’s central premise, which is that courts may restrict remedies
only to the extent that the underlying workplace protections remain
intact. Nonetheless, the wider lens view offers an attractively
simplistic analysis: denying recovery altogether discourages illegal
employment relationships and supports national immigration
objectives.
IV. DIMINISHED RIGHTS, DECLINING CITIZENSHIP
To this point, I have considered the rights of unauthorized workers
in terms of statutory purpose and immigration policy. By applying
239. See Martinez, supra note 54, at 665 (arguing that the “wider lens” approach
has “shifted the focus from protecting the rights of workers” to the workers’
immigration status).
240. Vu & Schwartz, supra note 96, at 47.
241. See, e.g., In re Reyes, 814 F.2d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 1987) (Jones, J., dissenting)
(arguing in favor of distinguishing between citizens and unauthorized workers in
FLSA cases); Patel v. Sumani Corp., 660 F. Supp. 1528, 1531 (N.D. Ala. 1987),
rev’d sub nom. Patel v. Quality Inn S., 846 F.2d 700 (11th Cir. 1988) (questioning
whether an unauthorized immigrant is “an individual,” as defined by the FLSA).
242. See, e.g., Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 384 F.3d 822, 834–35 (9th Cir. 2004) (Bea, J.,
dissenting) (rejecting the idea that antidiscrimination policies outweigh immigration
policies); Egbuna v. Time-Life Libraries, Inc., 153 F.3d 184, 186–87 (4th Cir. 1998)
(en banc) (per curiam) (rejecting a Title VII claim brought by an unauthorized
immigrant); Escobar v. Spartan Sec. Serv., 281 F. Supp. 2d 895, 896–98 (S.D. Tex.
2003) (dismissing a Title VII claim based on the plaintiff’s immigration status);
Crespo v. Evergro Corp., 841 A.2d 471, 472 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004)
(dismissing a state discrimination claim based on the plaintiff’s immigration status).
243. See Part I (discussing the courts’ treatment of unauthorized workers’ rights
following Hoffman).
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these criteria to wage and antidiscrimination protections, I have
explained why the diminished rights outcome should not occur, but
could. Although the future rights of unauthorized immigrants will
depend largely on how courts determine these issues of purpose and
policy, the consequences of diminished rights are equally important.
Here, I explain why reducing workplace protections harms both
unauthorized immigrants and citizens.
At its core, the Supreme Court’s denial of basic workplace
remedies to unauthorized immigrants is rooted in notions of
communitarianism. A philosophy debated among political scientists
and immigration theorists, communitarianism explains how fixed
244
borders define the community and preserve scarce resources. From
this perspective, extending membership rights to outsiders who have
violated the country’s borders threatens democracy and membership
245
for those lawfully present.
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on unauthorized workers
implicitly fashions a communitarian vision of the workplace.
The Hoffman Court denied Jose Castro the ability to recover monetary
remedies for his illegal discharge because he had knowingly violated
246
the nation’s immigration laws.
If foreign nationals can cross the
border at will, tender fraudulent documents, and assert workplace
claims on par with citizens, then our nation’s “critical” system of
247
verifying who belongs at the workplace would be undermined.
In order to reinforce the border—the nation’s primary mechanism
for defining membership—employment protections cannot extend
fully to outsiders. Thus, Hoffman constructs a world in which citizens
are allowed to seek redress for incidents of discrimination, relegating
unauthorized workers to a lawless remedial realm to match their
lawless existence in the community.
Here I offer a theoretical response to the communitarian rationale
for denying workplace rights to unauthorized immigrants. I argue
that employment protections are “rights of partial inclusion” because
they reflect a distinctive sphere—the workplace—where
unauthorized immigrants should be placed on par with citizens in

244. Gordon & Lenhardt, supra note 9, at 2501. See generally WALZER, supra note
19, at 31–63 (considering how communities determine membership and the benefits
that arise from such membership).
245. See Bosniak, supra note 178, at 1002–03 (discussing the liberal exclusionist
view of immigration policy).
246. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 149–50 (2002).
247. Id. at 151.
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248

vindicating collective rights.
Because of the communal nature of
workplace rights that ensure better working conditions for all
employees, I assert that employment protections are unlike other
rights commonly discussed among communitarians, such as public
benefits and legal status. I explain why enforcing wage and
antidiscrimination rights, even if only on an individual basis,
constitutes collective action that ensures better working conditions
for immigrants and citizens alike. In contrast to arguments that favor
restricting resources to lawful residents, I explain how, if applied
broadly, employment protections can preserve community identity.
A. Rights of Partial Inclusion
What does it mean to work without rights? What are the
consequences of the ambiguous and diminished rights outcomes for
citizens and immigrants? The current decline in rights represents an
upheaval of fundamental notions of citizenship. Although the
understanding of what constitutes “citizenship” varies widely across
disciplines, sociologists, political theorists, and legal theorists
249
generally describe citizenship in terms of “membership.”
To be a
citizen is to belong to a broader community. The bonds that create
membership are described disparately in terms of legal status, rights,
250
political engagement, and self-identification.
Unauthorized immigrants do not fit neatly into any of these
descriptions. At first glance, it appears rather oxymoronic to refer to
an “unauthorized immigrant citizen.” This reaction derives largely
from our status-based understanding of citizenship. Citizenship is
associated primarily with legally recognized membership in the
political community. By definition, unauthorized immigrants are
251
excluded from this group.
But exclusion from one category of citizenship does not necessarily
lead to exclusion from all others. For example, one can be a rightsbased citizen—that is, enjoy some degree of civil and social rights—
without occupying any level of status citizenship. The experiences of
women and minorities in this country demonstrate that the converse
248. I do not mean to suggest that by equalizing employment rights, unauthorized
workers will enjoy the same wages, working conditions, or ability to assert those rights
as citizens. There is a large difference between possessing workplace rights and
having the ability to assert them. See infra text accompanying note 329 (discussing
the limits of equalized rights).
249. See LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY
MEMBERSHIP 18–20 (2006) (discussing theories of citizenship).
250. Id. at 20; see also Gordon & Lenhardt, supra note 9, at 2500 (noting that “the
term ‘citizenship’ is not a unitary concept”).
251. Bosniak, supra note 8, at 461–62.
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is true: many status citizens have lacked basic political and social
252
Likewise, unauthorized
rights throughout American history.
immigrants’ lack of formal citizenship does not necessarily implicate
their standing as rights-based citizens. In fact, until recently,
employment law extended equal rights to unauthorized
253
immigrants.
The notion of partial inclusion derives from theories of social
citizenship and equal citizenship discussed among political scientists
and social theorists. T.H. Marshall’s essay, Citizenship and Social
254
255
Class, introduced the theory of rights-based citizenship. Marshall
asserted that individuals must possess a complete collection of
rights—civil rights, political rights, and social rights—in order to
256
enjoy full citizenship. According to Marshall, the ability to exercise
all of these rights imbues in the holder “a direct sense of community
membership based on loyalty to a civilization which is a common
257
possession.”
Similar to the manner in which Marshall’s discourse on citizenship
has influenced social and political thought, Kenneth Karst’s notion of
258
citizenship as “belonging” has greatly impacted citizenship talk
259
Karst states, “The principle of equal
among legal theorists.
citizenship presumptively insists that the organized society treats each
individual as a person, one who is worthy of respect, one who
252. See Jennifer Gordon & R.A. Lenhardt, Rethinking Work and Citizenship,
55 UCLA L. REV. 1161, 1185–86 (2008) (noting that status citizens can lack civil and
social rights).
253. There has never been perfect “equality” of employment rights between
citizens and immigrants.
Some states restrict unemployment and workers’
compensation benefits to citizens or lawful residents. Likewise, government
employment may depend on immigration status. See generally 1 A. PETER MUTHARIKA,
Access to Economic Activity, in THE ALIEN UNDER AMERICAN LAW (1980 & Supp. 1984).
However, with few exceptions, nearly every jurisdiction extended the core wage and
antidiscrimination protections discussed here to unauthorized immigrants prior to
Hoffman. See Part I (discussing the historical development of employment rights for
unauthorized immigrants).
254. T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, in THE CITIZENSHIP DEBATES:
A READER 93 (Gershon Shafir ed., 1998).
255. Bosniak, supra note 8, at 464.
256. See Joel F. Handler, The Paradox of Inclusion: Social Citizenship and Active Labor
Market Policies 6 (Univ. of Cal., L.A. Law Sch. Pub. Law Research Paper No. 01-20,
2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=290927
(discussing Marshall’s division of citizenship into three categories of rights).
257. T.H. MARSHALL, CLASS, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 92 (1964).
258. Kenneth Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment,
91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6 (1976) [hereinafter Karst, Equal Citizenship]. See generally
KENNETH KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION
(1989).
259. See, e.g., Gordon & Lenhardt, supra note 252, at 1186 (citing numerous
writings by Karst to explain the application of the term “belonging” in discussing
citizenship).
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260

‘belongs.’” Equal constitutional and civil rights are key components
of Karst’s belonging equation because “they nourish a vision of
American society that emphasizes tolerance and the value of
261
belonging.”
Equal citizenship has both individual and collective
components. Civil rights allow the individual to pursue economic
262
opportunities and cultural choices previously closed to him. At the
same time, the individual’s decision to assert those rights serves
society’s anti-caste ethic, while encouraging greater participation in
263
public life and private markets.
Rights of partial inclusion, as I describe them, share many of the
social and affective qualities of equal citizenship. Those persons who
hold rights of partial inclusion enjoy greater levels of acceptance and
264
belonging within their communities.
However, the theories of
Marshall and Karst have only limited salience here because they
265
concern the rights of formal citizens, not unauthorized immigrants.
The theory of partial inclusion is not as broad as Karst’s “ideal of
266
equality” and “full membership.”
By having the ability to assert
employment rights, unauthorized immigrants further the community
endeavor of ensuring fair treatment of all workers, but remain
excluded from other matters. For example, their rights of political
participation are severely constrained, and they remain vulnerable to
the reach of immigration law at all times.
As a normative matter, I do not mean to suggest that partial
inclusion should be the endpoint in defining the sphere of
membership.
This is not an endorsement, but rather an
acknowledgment of the second-class citizenship of unauthorized
immigrants. As Linda Bosniak has argued, even though advocates of
“equal citizenship” characterize the denial of full rights as
267
presumptively illegitimate, their focus remains on status citizens.
With unauthorized immigrants, the focus on universality falls away;
the scholarship on equal citizenship either ignores the group
altogether or implicitly endorses distinctions between formal citizens
260. Karst, Equal Citizenship, supra note 258, at 6.
261. Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity,
64 N.C. L. REV. 303, 337 (1986).
262. Id.
263. Id. at 337–38.
264. See Gordon & Lenhardt, supra note 252, at 1187 (describing citizenship as
“full acceptance within the local and national community”).
265. See id. at 1196–98 (arguing that scholarship on rights-based citizenship never
“seriously engage[s] with immigration as a factor in the contemporary workplace”).
266. Karst, supra note 261, at 371.
267. See Linda Bosniak, Citizenship and Work, 27 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 497,
500 (2000) (contrasting the negative connotation associated with second-class
citizenship with the neutral classifications contained within status citizenship).
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268

and aliens. Noncitizens are undoubtedly “partial members” of the
269
community. The fact that they are subject to deportation—a threat
citizens never face—means that unauthorized immigrants cannot
270
enjoy the form of equal citizenship envisioned by Karst and others.
Acknowledging the second-class citizenship of unauthorized
immigrants does not cede the argument over the extent of rights
afforded to the group; there are gradations of second-class
271
citizenship.
Between having no rights and some rights, partial
inclusion is a more palatable alternative to a growing trend of pure
exclusion. The concept of immigrant as “outlaw” is making a
272
comeback.
This movement, as reflected in the Supreme Court’s
recent jurisprudence on unauthorized workers, is the result of a
vacuum created by immigration law. By defining who is “in” and who
is “out,” immigration law leaves open the question of how to treat
those who should be “out” but nevertheless make it “in.”
One response is to deny all rights to members of the group so as to
discourage their entry and encourage their swift departure. The
partial inclusion theory presented here offers an alternative method
for filling the void. It argues that both the immigrant and larger
community (including status citizens) benefit from a broad
application of workplace protections.
The communal nature of workplace protections extends beyond
the protections afforded by traditional labor law—such as the right to
join a union and bargain collectively—to wage and antidiscrimination
protections. In fact, in some instances, the so called “individual
rights” afforded by wage and antidiscrimination statutes can be more
effective vehicles for achieving collective ends than traditional labor
273
law currently allows.
For example, by enabling unauthorized
268. Id. at 500–51 (discussing the application of rights-based citizenship to the
subject of work).
269. Kevin R. Johnson, “Aliens” and the U.S. Immigration Laws: The Social and Legal
Construction of Nonpersons, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 263, 271 (1997).
270. See id. (arguing that aliens are partial members of the community).
271. Gerald L. Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws: Government Services, Proposition 187, and
the Structure of Equal Protection Doctrine, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1428 (1995).
272. See ELIZABETH HULL, WITHOUT JUSTICE FOR ALL 86–87 (1985) (discussing the
outlaw concept); see also Moreau v. Oppenheim, 663 F.2d 1300, 1307–08
(5th Cir. 1981) (“We seriously doubt whether illegal entry, standing alone, makes
outlaws of individuals, permitting their contracts to be breached without legal
accountability.”); Neuman, supra note 271, at 1441 (criticizing the outlaw
perspective).
273. See Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685,
2721–44 (2007) (explaining how employment protections can serve as a locus for
collective action among workers). This approach contrasts with the typical
characterization of employment protections as individual rights. See, e.g., James J.
Brudney, A Famous Victory: Collective Bargaining Protections and the Statutory Aging
Process, 74 N.C. L. REV. 939, 1026–27 (1996) (describing the proliferation of federal
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immigrant women to sue for sexual harassment and recover
appropriate remedies, Title VII grants plaintiffs partial membership
rights in a community comprised of formal citizens and other
employees. Not only does the plaintiff defend her individual
autonomy and personal dignity, she stands with other workers in
pursuing the shared objective of attaining a discrimination-free
workplace. The individual enforcement of workplace norms benefits
several groups of workers, including the plaintiff, her coworkers, and
future employees who join a workplace reformed (hopefully) by their
predecessor’s actions. This collective endeavor—forming identity
(i.e., “who we are”) and preserving rights (i.e., “what we have”)—
is the precise undertaking of the communitarians.
B. Preserving Community
Communitarians defend the nation-state’s right to bounded
citizenship. In his seminal work, Spheres of Justice, Michael Walzer
argues that countries may exclude outsiders in order to preserve
274
national identities. Walzer notes that theories of distributive justice
presuppose the existence of “a bounded world, a community within
which distributions take place, a group of people committed to
275
dividing, exchanging, and sharing, first of all among themselves.”
276
Hard borders preserve scarce benefits and define the community.
Walzer’s defense of bounded citizenship has both psychological and
sociological qualities. The nation-state’s fixed borders instill a feeling
of belonging in those who reside within, while allowing them to
protect the community’s rights and resources collectively. If those
who violate the border can make a claim on the community’s rights,
society is less able to define its common purpose and pursue liberal
277
values.
Much of the debate over borders comes down to what Peter Spiro
describes as the “citizenship dilemma,” in which extending formal
278
citizenship to more persons dilutes national identity. Spiro argues
statutes focused on individually enforced rights); Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law
of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 329 (2005)
(discussing the rise of the individual rights model in response to the limitations of
the collective bargaining model).
274. WALZER, supra note 19, at 31–63.
275. Michael Walzer, The Distribution of Membership, in BOUNDARIES: NATIONAL
AUTONOMY AND ITS LIMITS 1 (Peter G. Brown & Henry Shue eds., 1981).
276. See Gordon & Lenhardt, supra note 9, at 2501 (noting scholarly critiques of
communitarian arguments).
277. See Peter Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
88–89 (1984) (describing communitarian values as reflecting “vague, even circular,
notions of social expectations and relationships”).
278. Peter J. Spiro, The Citizenship Dilemma, 51 STAN. L. REV. 597, 599 (1999).
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that as residents develop increasing loyalties to nonstate
279
communities, America becomes “inclusive but inevitably weak.”
The theory of partial inclusion demonstrates how arguments over
status citizenship fail to delineate the bounds of rights-based
citizenship. Even if granting formal citizenship to more residents
diminishes national identity (a questionable assumption), extending
rights of partial inclusion to unauthorized immigrants does just the
opposite. When unauthorized immigrants possess the formal power
to challenge exploitation at the workplace, the notion of who “we”
are is strengthened. Conversely, when courts relegate residents to a
lawless working subclass—as in Hoffman—a nation cannot seriously
280
define itself in egalitarian terms, even if only aspirationally.
Communitarian dialogue often glosses over the precise “rights”
and “benefits” bounded citizenship preserves. The most fundamental
benefit at stake, of course, is immigration status itself. Formal status
is a scarce resource in the sense that only a certain number of people
can enter the country before residents lose faith in the purpose of
national boundaries. The tradeoff has been characterized as an
“admissions-status” dynamic, in which the expansion of immigrant
281
rights reduces support for large-scale immigration.
The more the
state formally recognizes immigrants, the less likely citizens will
282
tolerate increased admissions.
This dynamic played out in the
1980s when Congress granted legal status to over two million
unauthorized immigrants in exchange for increased border
283
protection and workplace enforcement.
The same tradeoff is
present in today’s immigration reform proposals that require the
government to seal the border in exchange for a large-scale
284
legalization program.
Employment protections do not require the same kind of tradeoff
as represented by the admissions-status dynamic.
Immigrants
constitute a crucial portion of the workforce needed to enforce

279. See id. at 601 (noting that the thinning of the American identity is
“perhaps . . . not a bad thing”).
280. See Maria Pabón López, The Intersection of Immigration Law and Civil Rights Law:
Noncitizen Workers and the International Human Rights Paradigm, 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 611,
615–17 (2006) (arguing that the national commitment to equality and fairness does
not always extend to noncitizen workers who face exploitative working conditions).
281. Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Citizenship Paradox in a Transnational Age,
106 MICH. L. REV. 1111, 1122 (2008).
282. Id.
283. Kobach, supra note 27, at 1330; Osuna, supra note 82, at 331.
284. See Michael J. Wishnie, Labor Law After Legalization, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1446,
1446–48 (2008) (discussing immigration reform).
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285

employment laws.
As the number of unauthorized workers
286
increases, their exclusion from employment protections diminishes
the group of would-be workplace enforcers. With citizens standing
alone as rights-holders, they become relatively more costly to employ,
287
thereby diminishing employer demand for their services.
In contrast to the admissions-status dynamic, citizens should support
workplace rights for unauthorized immigrants in order to equalize
the labor market and enable all employees to secure protections
reserved for the community.
As with the comparison to status citizenship, employment rights
cannot be analogized to public benefits—another scarce resource
288
communitarians seek to protect.
For example, political scientist
Gary Freeman argues, “The welfare state . . . seeks to take care of its
own, and its ability to do so is premised on its ability to construct a
kind of safe house in which to shelter its members from the outside
289
world.” The calculus is presented as a zero-sum game in which the
rights of citizens decline at a rate proportionate to the gains made by
290
unauthorized immigrants. Because natural and social resources are
finite, the argument goes, a nation must distribute those items only to
291
those who have obtained the community’s permission to enter.
The theory of partial inclusion highlights the error of applying
such distributive justice rationales to workplace rights. Although
society generally accepts the premise that when times are tight, the
292
nation’s redistributive aims should serve its own, employment
285. See RANDY CAPPS ET AL., URBAN INST., A PROFILE OF THE LOW-WAGE IMMIGRANT
WORKFORCE 1 (2003), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310880_lowwage_
immig_wkfc.pdf (estimating that immigrants comprise fourteen percent of the
workforce and twenty percent of the low-wage workforce).
286. See PASSEL, supra note 1, at i (estimating that 500,000 new unauthorized
immigrants come to the United States each year).
287. See Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 4, at 45 (discussing the competitive
advantage immigrants gain in the labor market because of their unwillingness to
assert workplace claims).
288. See, e.g., PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT:
ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY 92–95 (1985) (discussing birthright
citizenship and the welfare state).
289. Gary Freeman, Migration and the Political Economy of the Welfare State,
485 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 51, 54 (1986).
290. See Kevin R. Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration: The Intersection of
Immigration Status, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1509, 1518 (1995)
(listing the societal costs of restricting benefits); see also Bosniak, supra note 178, at
1000 (summarizing the argument that extending rights to noncitizens undermines
immigration enforcement).
291. See Bosniak, supra note 178, at 1001 (discussing protectionist view that
immigrants drain societal resources).
292. Rodríguez, supra note 281, at 1124 (discussing the apparent conflict between
a nation-state’s redistributive objectives and providing noncitizens with greater levels
of status).
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protections are not limited goods. For example, the notion of what it
means to work in America is not diluted when unauthorized
immigrants can sue for sexual harassment. In fact, the exact opposite
is true: workplace identity is diluted when only a subset of the
workforce can claim the bounty of employment protections. Title VII
expressly places plaintiffs in the role of private attorneys general in
order to redress not only their “own injury but also [to] vindicate[]
the important congressional policy against discriminatory
293
employment practices.”
This is a national project “of the highest
294
priority.”
Likewise, the EEOC relies on “a broad sample of claims” from
295
which to investigate and prosecute charges of discrimination.
A rule that diminishes this pool impairs the agency’s ability to achieve
the collective goal of combating unlawful employment practices.
The same is true for wage and labor protections, which depend on
individual complaints in order to ensure better working conditions
296
for all employees.
Employment rights are not scarce resources.
By limiting these rights—thereby creating false scarcity—the
Supreme Court diminishes their value.
C. Fostering Belonging
The various notions of citizenship share the idea that, at its core,
297
citizenship represents “belonging.”
The feeling of belonging has
both personal and social attributes. Identity-based citizenship shapes
the individual’s self-definition, while fostering solidarities within the
298
nation-state among its members.
Much of the current hostility
toward unauthorized immigrants can be traced to identity-based
citizenship. There is a growing perception among Americans that
299
unauthorized immigrants do not belong and do not want to belong.
Unauthorized immigrants increasingly live multiple lives, speak
multiple languages, live in multiple countries, and form social,
economic, and cultural ties to countries and non-state
293. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 45 (1974).
294. See N.Y. Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 63 (1980) (citing
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 416–17 (1978)).
295. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 296 n.11 (2002).
296. NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 122 (1972); see also Wishnie, supra note 10,
at 518 n.111 (discussing FLSA complaints).
297. BOSNIAK, supra note 249, at 20 (noting the role “belonging” plays in the
discourse on citizenship).
298. See Bosniak, supra note 8, at 480–81 (summarizing scholarly discourse on the
emotional aspects of citizenship).
299. See JACOBSEN, supra note 2, at 42 (discussing public attitudes toward illegal
immigration).
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300

communities.
Initially viewing their stay in the United States as
temporary, international migrants often see work in the United States
301
They
as a way to attain economic and political benefits at home.
experience a “life without clear boundaries and without secure or
302
303
singular identities,” giving rise to mixed loyalties.
Several immigration scholars have examined the “belonging” of
304
noncitizens.
For example, Adam Cox and Eric Posner have
evaluated the issue in light of asymmetric information and the
305
economics of contracts. Cox and Posner argue that noncitizens are
less likely to make “country-specific investments,” such as developing
relationships or learning new languages, if host countries do not
306
commit to the immigrants’ continued residence.
The more
tenuous the nation-state’s commitment to the immigrant, the less
307
likely she invests in the country.
As a normative matter, Cox and
Posner contend that, all things being equal, it is better for
immigrants to make country-specific investments because they
enhance the value of the relationship for countries and immigrants
308
alike.
Cristina Rodríguez has explored the issue of belonging in light of
309
increasing transnationalism. She argues that the new global order
heightens the state’s need to create frameworks for belonging, even
310
among immigrants who maintain a temporary intent to stay. This is
true because what often begins as an intended short-term visit to the

300. See Alejandro Portes, Global Villagers: The Rise of Transnational Communities,
AM. PROSPECT, Mar. 1, 1996, at 77 (describing the cross-national communities of
many immigrants).
301. See Gordon & Lenhardt, supra note 252, at 1220–21 (arguing that immigrants
enjoy citizenship gains at home from work performed in the United States).
302. MICHAEL WALZER, ON TOLERATION 87 (1997).
303. Spiro, supra note 278, at 619–21; see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Between
National and Post-National: Membership in the United States, 4 MICH. J. RACE & L. 241,
241–42 (1999) (discussing the rise of sub-national and supra-national identities).
304. See, e.g., HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 168–88 (2008) (discussing the
need for more inclusive visions of citizenship for immigrants); Aleinikoff, supra note
303, at 241–43 (discussing migrants and national membership); Gordon & Lenhardt,
supra note 252, at 1185–90 (describing work as a pathway to citizenship); David A.
Martin, Due Process and Membership in the National Community: Political Asylum and
Beyond, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 165, 210–19 (1983) (assessing the differential due process
protections granted in accordance with the degree of membership held); Neuman,
supra note 271, at 1427–28 (discussing noncitizens’ “indicia of membership”).
305. Adam B. Cox & Eric Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigration Law,
59 STAN. L. REV. 809, 833 (2007).
306. Id. at 834.
307. Id. at 827–28.
308. Id.
309. Rodríguez, supra note 281, at 1119.
310. Id.
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United States becomes permanent as an immigrant forms ties to
311
But even for those
employers, social networks, and citizens.
immigrants who never relinquish their intent to stay temporarily,
312
American society should create opportunities for social investment.
Without any affiliation to the host country, immigrants become
“a laboring class with a minimal stake in the long-term prosperity of
313
the society.”
This outcome undermines the state’s interest in
314
encouraging residents to be good social actors.
Although Cox, Posner, and Rodríguez generally share the same
objective of encouraging belonging among noncitizens, their
methods for achieving that goal are discussed exclusively in terms of
immigration policy. Cox and Posner argue that countries can
encourage country-specific investments through “ex ante” screening,
which means offering some form of immigration status to
“a particular immigrant on the basis of pre-entry information” early
315
in the immigration process.
Rodríguez contends that host
countries can build “ties that anchor even the highly mobile migrant”
316
through more liberal visa policies.
The theory of partial inclusion offers an additional method for
encouraging identity-based citizenship through employment law.
It explains how work and the enforcement of workplace rights
provide unauthorized immigrants with meaningful connections to
the communities in which they reside. These connections benefit
citizens by ensuring that all residents have a stake in the welfare of
their society.
Because it provides people with dignity, achievement, and personal
317
identity, work itself can serve as a crucial pathway to citizenship.
The workplace is one of the few remaining centers of integration in
the United States where people of different races, ethnicities, and

311. See Cristina M. Rodríguez, Guest Workers and Integration: Toward a Theory of
What Immigrants and Americans Owe One Another, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 219, 267
(2007) (noting that “intentions can and do change”); see also Maria L. Ontiveros,
Noncitizen Immigrant Labor and the Thirteenth Amendment: Challenging Guest Worker
Programs, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 923, 923 (2007) (arguing that even immigrants who
intend to reside in the United States temporarily form ties to the host country).
312. Rodríguez, supra note 311, at 265–66.
313. Id. at 267.
314. Id. at 266; see also Martin, supra note 304, at 195 (discussing the need for
residents to recognize and fulfill reciprocal obligations).
315. Cox & Posner, supra note 305, at 812 (emphasis omitted).
316. Rodríguez, supra note 311, at 266–67.
317. See JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 1–2
(1991) (discussing citizenship as “standing,” which is defined in part by one’s ability
to receive remuneration for labor).
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statuses have the opportunity to engage in a shared experience.
Through employment, immigrants strengthen their associations with
coworkers and worksites. Viewed from this vantage, employment is
not only a magnet drawing immigrants to the United States; it is a
crucial anchor tying them to the community.
Perhaps somewhat paradoxically, even immigration restrictionists
should support extending rights of partial inclusion to nonmembers.
As discussed above, the availability of employment rights does not
319
affect a worker’s immigration-related incentives.
Assuming that a
large class of unauthorized immigrants will continue to reside in the
320
country, the question becomes: Does the community gain from
legal restrictions that isolate this group or from mechanisms that
encourage participation? Undoubtedly, both citizens and immigrants
gain when all residents have opportunities to invest in the community
with a shared sense of common purpose. Because such opportunities
remain rare for unauthorized immigrants in other areas, the worksite
is a unique place where this type of loyalty formation can take place.
In addition to fostering a “feeling” of belonging, rights of partial
inclusion encourage unauthorized immigrants to take actions that
inure to the benefit of the entire workforce. Immigration and
constitutional scholars often describe civic republicanism as
321
citizenship’s central virtue.
Those who engage in a country’s
322
Although the
political life are considered “good citizens[].”
discourse on this type of citizenship usually explains how the polity
benefits from active participation, it also relates to identity formation.
“We” belong because of our shared commitment to democratic
principles and engagement in self-government. In its strictest form,
political citizenship does not apply to unauthorized immigrants.
After all, they cannot vote in elections and have next to no political
323
voice.
Likewise, the notion of “workplace citizenship”—having an
324
active voice in workplace governance—seems somewhat ill-fitting.
318. See Gordon & Lenhardt, supra note 252, at 1191 (arguing that the workplace
enables people to develop citizenship skills across racial and ethnic lines);
Vicki Schultz, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1885 (2000) (arguing that a more
democratized vision of work can reshape social life).
319. See Part III (discussing the limited effect employment rights have on
immigration trends).
320. See Wishnie, supra note 284, at 1458–59 (discussing the “enduring
undocumented population”).
321. See Bosniak, supra note 267, at 501 (discussing scholarship on “equal
citizenship”).
322. Id.
323. See Johnson, supra note 269, at 265 (noting the limited political rights of
noncitizens).
324. See BOSNIAK, supra note 249, at 197 n.1 (discussing “workplace citizenship”).
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Although unauthorized immigrants can join worker centers, unions,
325
and employee committees, their lack of status often inhibits the
kind of forceful participation described by the self-governance
326
model.
Rights of partial inclusion offer another avenue for unauthorized
immigrants to actively engage in the workplace. The immigrant
improves conditions for all workers by opposing illegal employment
practices.
As with more traditional expressions of workplace
citizenship, however, the fear of retaliation limits the immigrant’s
willingness to exercise those rights. The difference between rights of
partial inclusion and traditional notions of workplace citizenship
(i.e., workplace governance) relates to the timing of the citizenship
activity.
Although actions such as joining unions or worker
committees typically occur while the immigrant is still an employee,
unauthorized immigrants need not exercise rights of partial inclusion
until after the employment relationship has ended. For example,
if an employer fails to pay overtime to a group of unauthorized
immigrants, the workers can delay suing for the unpaid wages until
they have left the business that has committed the wage violation.
Though the threat of deportation remains ever-present, the
immigrant is somewhat more willing to exercise rights of partial
inclusion given that the threat of retaliatory discharge no longer
exists.
In addition to timing, there is a difference in scale. Traditional
notions of workplace citizenship rely on a critical mass of immigrant
workers exercising their voices collectively. Although this is certainly
327
possible, it remains a somewhat unlikely proposition given the
highly stratified, low-wage sectors occupied by most unauthorized
328
workers.
In contrast, rights of partial inclusion do not require a
large group of employees to act in order to bring about profound
changes to the workplace. For example, a single lawsuit brought by
an unauthorized worker, whether individually or as a representative
of a larger class, can drastically alter industry-wide practices in hiring,
325. See Gordon & Lenhardt, supra note 252, at 1217 (explaining how workplace
participation encourages loyalty formation).
326. See Hiroshi Motomura, Choosing Immigrants, Making Citizens, 59 STAN. L. REV.
857, 865–66 (2007) (discussing unauthorized immigrants’ incentives for investing in
host countries).
327. See, e.g., Andrew Martin, Burger King Grants Raise to Pickers, N.Y. TIMES, May 24,
2008, at C1 (describing the successful protest of tomato harvesters in southwest
Florida).
328. See Gordon & Lenhardt, supra note 252, at 1197–98 (citing language as one
barrier that low-wage, immigrant workers may face in attempting to engage in
deliberations with coworkers who are longtime residents and citizens).
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promotion, and wage payments that affect both citizen and
noncitizen employees.
Even as they are marginalized in other social and political spheres,
unauthorized immigrants “belong” to the workplace. As such, rights
of partial inclusion create avenues for participation among workers
who will continue to reside in the country regardless of the
employment protections they enjoy.
CONCLUSION
The rights of unauthorized workers remain in doubt. Although
functional
arguments—administrative
competence,
remedial
purpose, and statutory gutting—tend toward equalized rights, the
conflict between employment inclusion and border exclusion
remains. The malleability of the Supreme Court’s incentives-based
critique means that, at its most basic level, any employment remedy
can be characterized as a “reward” for illegal behavior. If the rewards
rationale takes hold, the rights of unauthorized workers, which are
now recognized in the breach, will not be recognized at all.
This outcome should be evaluated with caution because it profoundly
impacts our contemporary understanding of community.
By describing the function workplace protections can serve in
fostering belonging and participation among noncitizens, I recognize
the limits of employment rights. Abstract discussions of citizenship’s
inclusiveness can mask the real-life exploitation and hardship many
329
unauthorized workers endure.
Indeed, even when the state
recognizes the rights of unauthorized workers, the threat of
deportation will always prevent a great many immigrants from
exercising those formal rights. Nonetheless, the movement toward
exclusion—as reflected in the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence
on unauthorized workers—does even greater damage to the lives of
immigrants and the communities in which they live and work.
Just as immigration law defines the nation’s borders in order to
prevent outsiders from accessing limited resources, the Supreme
Court has attempted to restrict the fruits of workplace protections to
law-abiding citizens. But the workplace border does not serve the
same goals as the national border. In fact, the Court’s line-drawing
harms those within the circle precisely because unauthorized
immigrants are not allowed to enter. By extending employment

329. See Leti Volpp, Divesting Citizenship: On Asian American History and the Loss of
Citizenship Through Marriage, 53 UCLA L. REV. 405, 481 (2005) (discussing the limits
of citizenship).
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protections to all workers, partial inclusion furthers the community’s
self-definition, while providing unauthorized immigrants with a sense
of belonging in a world increasingly focused on their exclusion.

